CATHOLIC VICAR VS. CA

CATHOLIC VICAR VS. CA

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, petitioner, 
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN VALDEZ, respondents

G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988

Nature: Review on certiorari

Keywords: Recovery of possession, commodatum, adverse possession

Summary: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto since their predecessors’ house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.

GANCAYCO, J.

Facts:

-  1962: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (Vicar), petitioner, filed with the court an application for the registration of title over lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 situated in Poblacion Central, Benguet, said lots being used as sites of the Catholic Church, building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, dormitories, social hall and stonewalls.

- 1963: Heirs of Juan Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano claimed that they have ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3. (2 separate civil cases)

- 1965: The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of Vicar to lots 1 , 2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private respondents (heirs), the decision of the lower court was reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.

- VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his  application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.

- During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1) witness, who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the return of the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000 per month. On the other hand, Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet, Atty. Sison, who testified that the land in question is not covered by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs. Vicar dispensed with the testimony of Mons. Brasseur when the heirs admitted that the witness if called to the witness stand, would testify that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for 75 years continuously and peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.

Issue:

1. WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3 merely as bailee borrower in commodatum, a gratuitous loan for use.

2. Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an adverse possession on the part of the owner

Held:

1. YES. Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.

2. No. The bailees’ failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.

Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.

Ratio: The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the application for registration.

Ruling: WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182

Balacuit v. CFI, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182

Title of the Case: Balacuit et al., v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City; G.R. No. L-38429; June 30, 1988

Nature: Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan

Keywords: Regulatory Ordinaces, 1/2 price of Movie tickets for Minors, Police Power by the local government

Summary: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for review.  Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

GANCAYCO, J.

Facts: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and 12 years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid andconstitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

Ratio: It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way,to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.