Showing posts with label Consti II. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Consti II. Show all posts

Monday, January 22, 2018

United States vs. Judge Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002


United States vs. Judge Puruganan, G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002

Nature:  Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Keywords:  Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition; PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

Summary:   The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.  But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.  On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.  Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.  After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.  Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.  The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash.  After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. 

    Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still  no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts: 

This Petition is a sequel to Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522, accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Law.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila. The TRO prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, the Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions; (d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

Hence, this Petition

Issue:
 i.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069

ii.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail

iii.    Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

Held:  Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.  Regional Trial Court of
  Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

Ratio: 

i.    YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.  From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.  The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.  Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.  The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.  It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.  Sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

    Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.   To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
    Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a)    they are sufficient in form and substance
b)    they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c)    the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.  If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.  On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.  Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. 

ii.    Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.  It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.  Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue.  The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”  

    That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case.  Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is chargedHe should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

    Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.  It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.  Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1)    that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

    Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

    It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.  Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case.  Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.   

    Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself.  It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more.   Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,  delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
   
    That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
   
iii.    NO.

    Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.  The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.   A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.  He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition.  Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

    It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country.  He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.

Doctrine: Five Postulates of Extradition

1)    Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state.  We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2)    The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the  Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3)    The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a)    It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.  His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b)    An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c)    In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
d)    Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.  The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.

4)    Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty.  Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5)    There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a)    leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b)    remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.  Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.

People of the Philippines vs. Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, Jan. 19, 1995


People of the Philippines vs. Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, Jan. 19, 1995

Nature:   Before the Court is the appeal interposed by accused-appellant from the decision rendered by the Honorable Pedro C. Cacho, Presiding Judge of RTC in Pangasinan, which pronounced accused-appellant's culpability of the murder of May Villa Rica Sibayan. In addition to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua, Accused-Appellant.was required to pay to the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 in the form of exemplary damages, and P43,000.00 for actual expenses.

Keywords:  Accused of murder but SC ruled that it was homicide; rules on bail; reclusion perpetua; reclusion temporal

Summary: 

RTC - charged accused with Murder
SC - charged accused with Homicide, a crime punishable by Reclusion temporal, thus, the accused is entitled to bail.

MELO, J.

Facts:  On October 1990, at around 7 o'clock in the evening, Jojo Belmonte went out of his house located at Purok IV, Barangay Alac, Pangasinan to buy some cigarettes in a nearby store. Before Jojo Belmonte could buy the cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the words "You are one of them" ("Maysa ca met") in the vernacular, then started mauling him. Unable to endure the pain, Jojo fought back. A few minutes had gone into the fight when May Villarica (a.k.a. Lydia) Joselito, Agustin and Marcelina (Nenet), all surnamed Sibayan, arrived. May and Joselito tried to pacify the two protagonists, however, their efforts proved futile as Doro Nitcha refused to be pacified.

The fighting stopped upon the arrival of Doro's sister Victoria Corpuz (Baby) who, upon seeing the commotion, dragged Doro away from the fight and brought him home.

Likewise, Marcelina (Nenet), Agustin, May and Joselito proceeded towards their house located in front of the store where the incident occurred.

Not long thereafter and while the Sibayans were still on their way, appellant Florestan Nitcha, brother of Doro, arrived at the sari-sari store brandishing a gun and shouting in Tagalog, "Walanghiya kayo, putangina ninyo, papatayin ko kayong lahat!" After uttering those words, appellant fired his gun in the direction of the Sibayans, the bullet hitting May at the back of her head and existing through the middle of her forehead. Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but missed.

May was brought to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital in Tayug, Pangasinan where she was given first aid treatment. Upon the advice of a doctor, the victim was brought to a hospital in Dagupan City. May, however, expired on the way thereto.

Shortly after the shooting incident, appellant went back to his mother's house before proceeding to the police station of San Quintin, Pangasinan where he surrendered himself together with his service firearm.

Issue:  WON the accused is entitled to bail.

Held:  YES.

Ratio: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of a s amended, that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion id limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . .

The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

We are, however, not convicted that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was attendant in the killing. It must be recalled that Doro Nitcha, the brother of accused-appellant, was in a fight with one Jojo Belmonte and was forcibly dragged away from the fight and brought home by his sister, Victoria Corpus. Upon seeing his injured brother, accused-appellant became enraged and immediately dashed off to the scene of the fight. Per testimony of Joselito Sibayan, the husband of the victim, only 4 to 5 minutes had elapsed from the time Doro was dragged away to the time that accused-appellant arrived at the scene of the fight (pp. 6-7, t.s.n., February 2, 1993). Thus, at such a short interval, accused-appellant did not have sufficient time consciously adopt the mode of attack. To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.

However, we do not agree with the trial court that the crime committed was murder. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. This circumstance can only be applied, according to the tenor of article 13, sub-section 16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means, methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at the same time to eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the other party might offer. In United States vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926, it was held that the circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise a homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the preparation of the homicide without risk to himself. In the present case, the circumstances negative the hypothesis that the defendant reflected on the means, method and form of killing the offended party. There was absolutely nothing personal between the accused and Basas. He was, so he thought, erroneously, protecting the property which he was detailed to watch by killing the stranger. His purpose was to kill, the decision was sudden, and the position of the stranger was accidental and did not matter. In fact, in the nature of things, to give the other man an opportunity to defend himself or to return the attack would have been a contradiction.

The crime committed by accused-appellant is, therefore, homicide and not murder. The penalty for homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its medium period; and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed upon accused-appellant is an indeterminate sentence within the range of prision mayor, as minimum, and reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.

Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, and accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In all other respects, he appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Doctrine:  – murder; claim that arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation – Act of posting a bail bond, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of discretion when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua; If accused is convicted by the crime (reclusion perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted.

People of the Philippines vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675


         People of the Philippines vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675

Nature:  The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLV (145) Makati, Metro Manila dated March 18, 1986 rendered jointly in its Criminal Case No. 10476 and Criminal Case No. 10477, is before Us on automatic review.

Keywords: Accused of robbery and robbery with homicide; tortured to confess the crime; signed confession without counsel and was not allowed to read what he was signing. — ACQUITTED.

Summary: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

PARAS, J.

Facts:

VERSION OF THE RTC:
Two Japanese nationals were neighbours in San Lorenzo Village, Makati. Mr Koji Sato, a mechanical engineer rented a house at No. 32 Arguilla Street. He was living alone but had a housemaid by the name of Irene Jandayan and a cook named Delia Marcelino who was at the time on a Maternity leave, due to deliver a child with her husband, Pinlac, who had frequently visited Mr. Sato’s place.

A low concrete separated the house rented by Sato from that rented by Mr. Saeki Osamu, whose house No. 32 in the same street.

On April 7, at around 5pm, Sato went out of his house. At around 6:45, Jandayan, the housemaid, also left the house to begin her day-off. She locked all the doors prior to leaving and returned to her employer’s residence the morning of the following Monday. At 11:30pm, Sato returned to his house and noticed that his doors were already unlocked. He discovered that a few of his things were missing after a thorough inspection of the house. They were never recovered.

Thereafter, Sato reported the robbery at the Makati Police Station and requested the police to investigate his residence. It was when the police investigators had already reached Sato’s residence that he learned about the death of Osamu, his neighbor.

Investigators then gathered evidence at the residence of Osamu and took pictures of the scene of the crime. The death weapon, the kitchen knife marked Exhibit "Q" was recovered from the living room of the house. This was later turned over to the PC crime laboratory for chemical examination.

Going around the house the investigators saw the slashed screen wall near the back door. Several footprints were found in the backyard; these correspond to the impressions of the soles of Pinlac's shoes, Osamu’s maid, Evelyn Salomea, was investigated. She revealed that she saw Pinlac enter the house of Sato at seven o'clock in the evening, although she did not see him leave thereafter; and that Jandayan has knowledge of the address of Marcelino. Her two statements were introduced in evidence.

Subsequently, the policemen went to Marcelino's residence in Taguig, and, finding Pinlac thereat, invited him to the police station. Detective Samson (who also took the witness stand) opined that the killer made his entry by removing the panels of jalousies at the rear of the house and that fingerprints were lifted from the victim's house. Policemen Mallari submitted his final report, regarding this incident.

The foregoing findings of fact are vigorously denied by the accused.

VERSION OF THE ACCUSED:
He never left the premises of his house; this fact was corroborated by defense witness Barcelino Heramis who noticed accused's presence in the premises as he and his children were then practicing their musical instrument that evening.

At about 2 pm, 3 policemen came to his house in Taguig and arrested the accused for robbing Mr. Sato and for killing Mr. Osamu, without any warrant of arrest shown to him despite his demand.

The officers then brought the accused to the scene of the crime and was ordered to reenact according to what the police theorised how the crime was committed. It was at this moment that the prints of the sole of accused's shoes were all over the premises of Osamu and Sato's houses.

During the investigation at the precinct, he was tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged; and as a result of that unbearable physical torture, his lips and mouth suffered cuts and cracks to bleed furiously; and that blood dripped into his clothings down to his shoes, thus explaining why there are blood stains in his shoes. Before and during the arrest, the police officers have never mentioned about the stain of blood in accused's shoes which they could have easily detected during the arrest. They got his shoes only after it were stained with blood oozing from accused's lips and mouth as a result of the injuries he sustained from the torturers.

It was on that evening of April 9,1986 at about 9:00 o'clock, when accused could no longer bear the torture starting from 2:00 P.M. for seven (7) solid hours when he ultimately succumbed to the wishes of his torturers and finally signed a prepared confession which he was not even allowed to read, nor explained to him. The police investigators did not even wait in the following morning for the accused to sign the same considering that said confession was subscribed only on the following day April 10, 1986 by a certain Assistant Fiscal.

Issue:  Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held: No. The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

Ratio: The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. No direct evidence or testimony of any eyewitness was presented Identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime charged. The only evidence furnished by the police authorities were merely circumstantial evidence regarding the fingerprints of the accused found in the window stabs of the maid's quarters and in the kitchen cabinet in the house of Mr. Sato. But this was satisfactorily explained by the accused to the effect that aside from being a frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato where his wife works as a cook wherein at those times he could have unknowingly left his fingerprints, but most especially during the time when he was arrested and ordered to reenact. In the process he held some of these window slabs, walls, furniture, etc., in accordance with the order of the arresting officer. The only evidence presented by the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial confession of the accused, which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution.

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, .... He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.


Monday, August 14, 2017

Lawrence vs. Texas, June 26, 2003


Title of the Case: Lawrence vs. Texas, June 26, 2003
Nature: Petition for Certiorari filed in the US Supreme Court on July 16, 2002
Keywords: Landmark Case, Invalidated Sodomy law making same-sex sexual activity legal in every US state and territory.
Summary: County Criminal Court - Rejected contention of petitioners that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like provision of Texas Constitution; CA - rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions;

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Geddes Lawrences apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. The two were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.

The two exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The two, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.

The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the two accuseds federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicated that the Court of Appeals considered the US Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari (537 U. S. 1044 [2002], to consider 3 questions: (1) whether the criminal convictions under the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws; (2) Whether the criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment; and (3) Whether Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), should be overruled.

Issue:

1. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws?

2. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Ratio:

1. YES. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Under our rational basis standard of review, "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."

A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review. I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that Texas' sodomy law banning "deviate sexual intercourse" between consenting adults of the same sex, but not between consenting adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional.

Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." Id., at 633. Texas' invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas' desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating "a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake." Id., at 635. And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior. The Texas sodomy law "raise[s] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected." Id., at 634.

2. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define ones own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right. The case of Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.

Ruling: Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.

Note: A sodomy law is a law that defines certain sexual acts as crimes. The precise sexual acts meant by the term sodomy are rarely spelled out in the law, but are typically understood by courts to include any sexual act deemed to be "unnatural" or immoral. Sodomy typically includes anal sex, oral sex and bestiality. In practice, sodomy laws have rarely been enforced against heterosexual couples.

Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000


Title of the Case:  Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals
Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari
Keywords: Optical shop, Business Permit

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.
Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It  cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits

Ratio: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED: and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.

Doctrine: The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community.  Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.

 Requisites

1 -    LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power

2 -    LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

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