Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119 SCRA 597 (1982)

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. BOT, 119  SCRA 597 (1982)

Title of the Case: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs. Board of Transportation, 117 SCRA 597

Nature: Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., et al, and seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, of the Bureau of Land Transportation.

Keywords: TaxiCab Operators, phasing out of old cars, Equal Protection of the Law, Substantive Due Process

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

Facts:

• On October 10, 1977, The Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. à no car beyond 6 years can still be operated as taxi.

• Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 à applied it to succeeding years just add one year to both dates. à they had to surrender the expired taxi’s plates to the BoT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.

• Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis.

• On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.

The issues were in the form of questions that the petitioners presented to the SC through a query.

a. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?

b. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.

            (1) Equal protection of the law;

            (2) Substantive due process; and

            (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard?

Issue:

1.       WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were violated - NO.

2.       WON their equal protection rights were violated - NO.

Ratio: On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power

To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers:

Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the             Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

            Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree.

            The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry.

• Petitioner claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circular

- SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID. The board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data.

- Petitioner also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set and oppressive and they want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding their condition whether or not it was still safe and roadworthy despite age.

- Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to multiple standards and corruption

- Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based on cost and fair returns on the units

- Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair

On Equal Protection of the Law:

Petitioner allege that the circular targets and singles out the taxi industry = violation of their equal protection rights

-  Court said NO. Circular of the same kind are also being implemented in other cities like Cebu and is also in the process of conducting the same studies and policy formulations in other cities.

-  Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of the taxis in MM.

-  SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION - In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.

CONCLUSIONS:

-   Manila has more traffic which means that taxis in Metro Manila are more heavily used and more likely to   deteriorate.

-            The public has a right to convenience, comfort and safety in their public commute.

-            The danger posed by the dilapidated and old taxis is a valid nuisance that the Board can abate through the circular that it passed.

-            Absent a clear showing of any repugnancy of the circular it is deemed valid.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

NOTE: The State in the exercise of its police power, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs  and the  Court that implementation of the Circulars in Cebu City is already being effected, with the BOT in the process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.  It may also regulate property rights.  In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.

Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Nature: Petition for review

Keywords: fundamental right vs police power, energy conservation measure, alleged violation of equal protection clause, LOI (Letter of Instruction)

Summary:             The constitutionality of LOI No. 869, which was a response to the protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on weekends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of legislative power.” Respondents denied the above allegations.

FERNANDO, C.J.

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."

Issue: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.

Held: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property  for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

Ratio: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' "

In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' "

Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).

Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

Take Note:

The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 186, issued on May 31, 1979 is upheld. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deal with the use of one’s property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. 

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

Nature:

•     Petitioners filed with the RTC: Petition for Declaratory Judgment and prohibition with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. DENIED.

•       Filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari to set aside said order. DENIED.

Keywords: NMAT case. Police Power. Equal Protection Clause.

Summary: Petitioners sought admission into schools of medicine. However, petitioners did not pass the NMAT required by the Board of Medical Education.

Facts:  The petitioners sought to stop the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that the cut-off score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year  by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cut-off score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious."

Issues: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. 

Ratio: No.

Ruling: We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Notes:
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: 

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." 

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

x xx 

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from saidapplicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: 

"Admission requirements. — The medical college  may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cut off score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182

Balacuit v. CFI, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182

Title of the Case: Balacuit et al., v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City; G.R. No. L-38429; June 30, 1988

Nature: Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan

Keywords: Regulatory Ordinaces, 1/2 price of Movie tickets for Minors, Police Power by the local government

Summary: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for review.  Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

GANCAYCO, J.

Facts: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and 12 years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid andconstitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

Ratio: It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way,to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.

Duncan Association v Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, G.R. 162994, September 17, 2004.

Duncan Association v Glaxo Wellcome Philippines,  G.R.

162994, September 17, 2004.

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated May 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62434.

Keywords: Equal Protection Clause

Summary:Petitioner has a relationship with an employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm. Petitioner was made aware thru his employment contract that if having a relationship with an employee of a competing drug company would pose a possible conflict of interest, he may be asked to resign from Glaxo.

Facts:

• 25 Oct 1995: Petitioner Pedro Tecson(Tecson) was hired by herein respondent GlaxoWellcom Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as a medical representative in CamarinesSuur-Camarines Norte sales area. Tecson signed an employment contract, wherein he agreed, among others, to study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies; and if management  found that such relationship posed a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.

• September 1998: Tecson married Bettsyan employee of a rival pharmaceutical firm—Astra Pharmaceuticals.

• January 1999: Tecson's superiors informed him that his marriage to Bettsy had given rise to a conflict of interest. Negotiations ensued, with Tecson adverting to his wife's possible resignation from Astra, and Glaxo making it known that they preferred to retain his services owing to his good performance. Yet no resolution came to pass.

• September 1999: Tecson asked to be transferred to Glaxo’s Milk Division, but was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.

• November 1999: Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson sought Glaxo’s reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the matter to Glaxo’s Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-CamarinesNorte sales area.

• 15 November 2000: the Nat’l. Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with competitor companies was valid, and affirmed Glaxo's right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

• This decision was assailed by petitioners before the Court of Appeals and the Court, but to no avail.

Issue:Whether or Not Glaxo’s  policy against its employees marrying employees from competitor companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution;

Ratio: Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets.

Ruling: The record shows that Tecson was aware about the policy imposed by  Glaxo company, upon signing the contract, he voluntarily set his hands to follow the said policies. Albeit employees are free to cultivate relationships w/ and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. 

It is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise out of such relationships. As succinctly explained by the appellate court, thus:

The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to the individual.However, an employees personal decision does not detract the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum profit and business success. .

After Tecson married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict .Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that his wife would be the one to resign instead.  Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra.  Notably, the Court did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home province, Agusandel Sur, was included.  In effecting Tecson’s transfer, Glaxo even considered the welfare of Tecson’s family.  Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the part of Glaxo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

People of the Philippines vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56

People of the Philippines vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56

Nature: Original action instituted in this court for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance, more particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case.

Keywords: Equal Protection Clause; Act No. 4221 Probation Act,

Summary: Court of First Instance - rendered judgement of conviction sentencing Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party; CA - modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.; SC - denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

LAUREL, J.

Facts: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power  because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issue: WON Act No. 4221 denies the equal protection of the laws.

Held: YES. We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.

Ratio:

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions.

This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. The equal protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”

In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case.

In other words, statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

The guaranty of the equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed, however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No. 612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in section 2 thereof that "in cases triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . . . ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney — although not in the form had in the provinces — was considered a reasonable substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.

Ruling: S is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

NOTE: In issues involving the equal protection clause, the test developed by jurisprudence is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Tiu vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, Jan. 20, 1999

Tiu vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, Jan. 20, 1999

Nature:Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision promulgated on August 29, 1996, and Resolution dated November13, 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 37788.

The challenged Decision upheld the constitutionality and validity of Executive Order No. 97-A (EO 97-A), according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). MR was denied.

Keywords: Equal Protection Clause,

Summary:The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was questioned.

Facts:The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.

Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.  However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic Naval Base” only.  It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from enjoying the benefits granted by the law.  It has effectively discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid standards, in contravention(breach) of the equal protection guarantee.

The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly vests in the President the authority to delineate (define) the metes and bounds of the SSEZ.  He adds that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.

Issue: W/N E.O. 97 - A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Ratio: NO. Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.

Ruling:The Court held that the classification was based on valid and reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.  If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane(relevant)  to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germaneto the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, Nov. 11, 1993

Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, Nov. 11, 1993

Nature: This is a petition to withdraw the franking privilege from the Judiciary,and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

Keywords:Equal Protection, Franking Privilege of the Judiciary, Differently Situated Parties.

Summary:Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.

In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.

The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.

Facts:The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of this provision on the grounds that it violated equal protection, since the franking privilege of the President, VP, Senators, Members of the House of Rep., COMELEC, former Presidents, widows of former Pres., National Census and Statistics office and the people filing complaints against public officers was retained.

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and ProvincialProsecutors; the Tanod bayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

Issue: W/N Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 denies the Judiciary of equal protection

Ratio: Yes.

Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.

***The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.***

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Notes:

•            R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for OtherPurposes Connected Therewith."

•            Consti I: The petitioners also said that it violated Art VI Sec 26(2) of the Constitution. “No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.”