Lawrence vs. Texas, June 26, 2003

Title of the Case: Lawrence vs. Texas, June 26, 2003

Nature: Petition for Certiorari filed in the US Supreme Court on July 16, 2002

Keywords: Landmark Case, Invalidated Sodomy law making same-sex sexual activity legal in every US state and territory.

Summary: County Criminal Court - Rejected contention of petitioners that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like provision of Texas Constitution; CA - rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions;

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Facts: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Geddes Lawrence’s apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Petitioners were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. The two were arrested, held in custody over night, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the Peace.

The two exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Those contentions were rejected. The two, having entered a plea of nolo contendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court costs of $141.25.

The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District considered the two accused’s federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court, in a divided opinion, rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The majority opinion indicated that the Court of Appeals considered the US Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), to be controlling on the federal due process aspect of the case. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari (537 U. S. 1044 [2002], to consider 3 questions: (1) whether the criminal convictions under the Texas “Homosexual Conduct” law violate the 14th Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws; (2) Whether the criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment; and (3) Whether Bowers v. Hardwick (478 US 186 [1986]), should be overruled.

Issue:

1. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law—which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples—violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws?

2. Whether the petitioners' criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in their home violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Ratio:

1. YES. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." Under our rational basis standard of review, "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."

A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause, under any standard of review. I therefore concur in the Court's judgment that Texas' sodomy law banning "deviate sexual intercourse" between consenting adults of the same sex, but not between consenting adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional.

Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be "drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." Id., at 633. Texas' invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves nothing more than Texas' desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating "a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake." Id., at 635. And because Texas so rarely enforces its sodomy law as applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior. The Texas sodomy law "raise[s] the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected." Id., at 634.

2. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice. Our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 14th Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right. The case of Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.

Ruling: Thus, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.

Note: A sodomy law is a law that defines certain sexual acts as crimes. The precise sexual acts meant by the term sodomy are rarely spelled out in the law, but are typically understood by courts to include any sexual act deemed to be "unnatural" or immoral. Sodomy typically includes anal sex, oral sex and bestiality. In practice, sodomy laws have rarely been enforced against heterosexual couples.

Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

Title of the Case:  Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals

Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari

Keywords: Optical shop, Business Permit

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It  cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits

Ratio: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED: and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.

Doctrine: The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community.  Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.

 Requisites

1 -    LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power

2 -    LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Title of the Case: CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Keywords: Police Power, Hotel Business, Ermita-Malate area, taking of property without just compensation

TINGA, J.:

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Ratio: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Ruling: Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.