People of the Philippines vs. Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, Jan. 19, 1995

People of the Philippines vs. Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, Jan. 19, 1995

Nature:   Before the Court is the appeal interposed by accused-appellant from the decision rendered by the Honorable Pedro C. Cacho, Presiding Judge of RTC in Pangasinan, which pronounced accused-appellant's culpability of the murder of May Villa Rica Sibayan. In addition to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua, Accused-Appellant.was required to pay to the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 in the form of exemplary damages, and P43,000.00 for actual expenses.

Keywords:  Accused of murder but SC ruled that it was homicide; rules on bail; reclusion perpetua; reclusion temporal

Summary: 

RTC - charged accused with Murder

SC - charged accused with Homicide, a crime punishable by Reclusion temporal, thus, the accused is entitled to bail.

MELO, J.

Facts:  On October 1990, at around 7 o'clock in the evening, Jojo Belmonte went out of his house located at Purok IV, Barangay Alac, Pangasinan to buy some cigarettes in a nearby store. Before Jojo Belmonte could buy the cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the words "You are one of them" ("Maysa ca met") in the vernacular, then started mauling him. Unable to endure the pain, Jojo fought back. A few minutes had gone into the fight when May Villarica (a.k.a. Lydia) Joselito, Agustin and Marcelina (Nenet), all surnamed Sibayan, arrived. May and Joselito tried to pacify the two protagonists, however, their efforts proved futile as Doro Nitcha refused to be pacified.

The fighting stopped upon the arrival of Doro's sister Victoria Corpuz (Baby) who, upon seeing the commotion, dragged Doro away from the fight and brought him home.

Likewise, Marcelina (Nenet), Agustin, May and Joselito proceeded towards their house located in front of the store where the incident occurred.

Not long thereafter and while the Sibayans were still on their way, appellant Florestan Nitcha, brother of Doro, arrived at the sari-sari store brandishing a gun and shouting in Tagalog, "Walanghiya kayo, putangina ninyo, papatayin ko kayong lahat!" After uttering those words, appellant fired his gun in the direction of the Sibayans, the bullet hitting May at the back of her head and existing through the middle of her forehead. Appellant then aimed his gun at Joselito but missed.

May was brought to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital in Tayug, Pangasinan where she was given first aid treatment. Upon the advice of a doctor, the victim was brought to a hospital in Dagupan City. May, however, expired on the way thereto.

Shortly after the shooting incident, appellant went back to his mother's house before proceeding to the police station of San Quintin, Pangasinan where he surrendered himself together with his service firearm.

Issue:  WON the accused is entitled to bail.

Held:  YES.

Ratio: It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of a s amended, that:

. . . before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion id limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. . . .

The clear implication therefore, is that if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong — which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction — it would have likewise ruled that the accused's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction. Construing Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, this Court, in the en banc Resolution of 15 October 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:

Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.

We are, however, not convicted that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was attendant in the killing. It must be recalled that Doro Nitcha, the brother of accused-appellant, was in a fight with one Jojo Belmonte and was forcibly dragged away from the fight and brought home by his sister, Victoria Corpus. Upon seeing his injured brother, accused-appellant became enraged and immediately dashed off to the scene of the fight. Per testimony of Joselito Sibayan, the husband of the victim, only 4 to 5 minutes had elapsed from the time Doro was dragged away to the time that accused-appellant arrived at the scene of the fight (pp. 6-7, t.s.n., February 2, 1993). Thus, at such a short interval, accused-appellant did not have sufficient time consciously adopt the mode of attack. To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.

However, we do not agree with the trial court that the crime committed was murder. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. This circumstance can only be applied, according to the tenor of article 13, sub-section 16 of the Revised Penal Code, when the culprit employs means, methods or forms of execution which tend directly and specially to insure the commission of the crime and at the same time to eliminate or diminish the risk to his own person from a defense which the other party might offer. In United States vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926, it was held that the circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise a homicide to murder, where it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the preparation of the homicide without risk to himself. In the present case, the circumstances negative the hypothesis that the defendant reflected on the means, method and form of killing the offended party. There was absolutely nothing personal between the accused and Basas. He was, so he thought, erroneously, protecting the property which he was detailed to watch by killing the stranger. His purpose was to kill, the decision was sudden, and the position of the stranger was accidental and did not matter. In fact, in the nature of things, to give the other man an opportunity to defend himself or to return the attack would have been a contradiction.

The crime committed by accused-appellant is, therefore, homicide and not murder. The penalty for homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty imposable is reclusion temporal in its medium period; and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed upon accused-appellant is an indeterminate sentence within the range of prision mayor, as minimum, and reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.

Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, and accused-appellant is hereby found guilty of HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In all other respects, he appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

Doctrine:  – murder; claim that arrest was illegal for want of preliminary investigation – Act of posting a bail bond, apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty, is tantamount to foregoing the right to question the assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of discretion when the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua; If accused is convicted by the crime (reclusion perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted.

People of the Philippines vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675

•         People of the Philippines vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675

Nature:  The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLV (145) Makati, Metro Manila dated March 18, 1986 rendered jointly in its Criminal Case No. 10476 and Criminal Case No. 10477, is before Us on automatic review.

Keywords: Accused of robbery and robbery with homicide; tortured to confess the crime; signed confession without counsel and was not allowed to read what he was signing. — ACQUITTED.

Summary: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.

PARAS, J.

Facts:

VERSION OF THE RTC:

Two Japanese nationals were neighbours in San Lorenzo Village, Makati. Mr Koji Sato, a mechanical engineer rented a house at No. 32 Arguilla Street. He was living alone but had a housemaid by the name of Irene Jandayan and a cook named Delia Marcelino who was at the time on a Maternity leave, due to deliver a child with her husband, Pinlac, who had frequently visited Mr. Sato’s place.

A low concrete separated the house rented by Sato from that rented by Mr. Saeki Osamu, whose house No. 32 in the same street.

On April 7, at around 5pm, Sato went out of his house. At around 6:45, Jandayan, the housemaid, also left the house to begin her day-off. She locked all the doors prior to leaving and returned to her employer’s residence the morning of the following Monday. At 11:30pm, Sato returned to his house and noticed that his doors were already unlocked. He discovered that a few of his things were missing after a thorough inspection of the house. They were never recovered.

Thereafter, Sato reported the robbery at the Makati Police Station and requested the police to investigate his residence. It was when the police investigators had already reached Sato’s residence that he learned about the death of Osamu, his neighbor.

Investigators then gathered evidence at the residence of Osamu and took pictures of the scene of the crime. The death weapon, the kitchen knife marked Exhibit "Q" was recovered from the living room of the house. This was later turned over to the PC crime laboratory for chemical examination.

Going around the house the investigators saw the slashed screen wall near the back door. Several footprints were found in the backyard; these correspond to the impressions of the soles of Pinlac's shoes, Osamu’s maid, Evelyn Salomea, was investigated. She revealed that she saw Pinlac enter the house of Sato at seven o'clock in the evening, although she did not see him leave thereafter; and that Jandayan has knowledge of the address of Marcelino. Her two statements were introduced in evidence.

Subsequently, the policemen went to Marcelino's residence in Taguig, and, finding Pinlac thereat, invited him to the police station. Detective Samson (who also took the witness stand) opined that the killer made his entry by removing the panels of jalousies at the rear of the house and that fingerprints were lifted from the victim's house. Policemen Mallari submitted his final report, regarding this incident.

The foregoing findings of fact are vigorously denied by the accused.

VERSION OF THE ACCUSED:

He never left the premises of his house; this fact was corroborated by defense witness Barcelino Heramis who noticed accused's presence in the premises as he and his children were then practicing their musical instrument that evening.

At about 2 pm, 3 policemen came to his house in Taguig and arrested the accused for robbing Mr. Sato and for killing Mr. Osamu, without any warrant of arrest shown to him despite his demand.

The officers then brought the accused to the scene of the crime and was ordered to reenact according to what the police theorised how the crime was committed. It was at this moment that the prints of the sole of accused's shoes were all over the premises of Osamu and Sato's houses.

During the investigation at the precinct, he was tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged; and as a result of that unbearable physical torture, his lips and mouth suffered cuts and cracks to bleed furiously; and that blood dripped into his clothings down to his shoes, thus explaining why there are blood stains in his shoes. Before and during the arrest, the police officers have never mentioned about the stain of blood in accused's shoes which they could have easily detected during the arrest. They got his shoes only after it were stained with blood oozing from accused's lips and mouth as a result of the injuries he sustained from the torturers.

It was on that evening of April 9,1986 at about 9:00 o'clock, when accused could no longer bear the torture starting from 2:00 P.M. for seven (7) solid hours when he ultimately succumbed to the wishes of his torturers and finally signed a prepared confession which he was not even allowed to read, nor explained to him. The police investigators did not even wait in the following morning for the accused to sign the same considering that said confession was subscribed only on the following day April 10, 1986 by a certain Assistant Fiscal.

Issue:  Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.

Held: No. The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.

Ratio: The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. No direct evidence or testimony of any eyewitness was presented Identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime charged. The only evidence furnished by the police authorities were merely circumstantial evidence regarding the fingerprints of the accused found in the window stabs of the maid's quarters and in the kitchen cabinet in the house of Mr. Sato. But this was satisfactorily explained by the accused to the effect that aside from being a frequent visitor in the house of Mr. Sato where his wife works as a cook wherein at those times he could have unknowingly left his fingerprints, but most especially during the time when he was arrested and ordered to reenact. In the process he held some of these window slabs, walls, furniture, etc., in accordance with the order of the arresting officer. The only evidence presented by the prosecution which could have been fatal, is the extra-judicial confession of the accused, which is now being assailed as violative of the Constitution.

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, .... He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Going to the instant case, We find that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance with these constitutional rights. Furthermore, the accused was not assisted by counsel and his alleged waiver was made without the assistance of counsel. The record of the case is also replete with evidence which was not satisfactorily rebutted by the prosecution, that the accused was maltreated and tortured for seven (7) solid hours before he signed the prepared extra-judicial confession.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.