Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994

Title of the Case: Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994

Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Keywords: Casino, Cagayan De Oro, Ordinance 3353 prohibiting issuance of business permit for operation of Casino; Ordinance 3375-93 Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and Providing Penalty for Violation Thereof

Summary: CA - declared ordinance invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement; SC - petition denied, CA decision AFFIRMED.

CRUZ, J.

Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.

On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid

Ratio: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmakingbody. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than thoseof the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mereordinance the mandate of the statute.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Himagan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 113811, Oct. 7, 1994

Himagan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 113811, Oct. 7, 1994

Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension

Keywords: Equal Protection Clause; Preventive Suspension for criminally charged Police Officers/Members charged of grave felonies

Summary: RTC - Denied motion to lift suspension under Sec 47 of RA 6975, motion for reconsideration denied as well. SC - Dismissed case for lack of merit

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts: Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that  Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

Issue: WON the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to equal protection of laws

Ratio: If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of

R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same

class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Note: Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:

Sec. 47.            Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).

Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:

Sec. 42.            Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

The fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 6 years are to be suspended during the entire duration of the case unlike other government employees is valid since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them.