Himagan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 113811, Oct. 7, 1994

Himagan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 113811, Oct. 7, 1994

Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension

Keywords: Equal Protection Clause; Preventive Suspension for criminally charged Police Officers/Members charged of grave felonies

Summary: RTC - Denied motion to lift suspension under Sec 47 of RA 6975, motion for reconsideration denied as well. SC - Dismissed case for lack of merit

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts: Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that:

Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.

Himagan assailed the suspension averring that  Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

Issue: WON the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to equal protection of laws

Ratio: If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of

R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the law; applies to all members of the same

class; and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Note: Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:

Sec. 47.            Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).

Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:

Sec. 42.            Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

The fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 6 years are to be suspended during the entire duration of the case unlike other government employees is valid since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them.