Punzalan vs Mun.Board of Manila

Punzalan vs Mun.Board of Manila

Keyword: Double taxation

Facts: This suit was commenced in the CFI of Manila by plaintiffs composed of 2 lawyers,a medical practitioner, public accountant, dental surgeon and pharmacist. It’s objective is to annul the ordinance No.3398 together w/ the provisions authorizing it. Said ordinance no. 3398 imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of tax “by a fine of not more than 200 pesos or by imprisonment of not more than 6 mos. Or both such fine in the discretion of the court”. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance of the provision of the law authorizing such but declared the ordinance illegal and void on the ground that the penalty provided for non-payment was not legally authorized. From this decision both parties appeal to this court. Petitioners contend that the ordinance is unjust and oppressive and amounts to double taxation.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No 3398 constitute double taxation?

Ruling: The Sc ruled that Legislature may select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others untaxed. Manila offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces. The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person “exercising” or “pursuing” in the City of Manila but does not say that such person must have his office in Manila. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked where one tax is imposed by the state( national gov.) and the other is imposed by the city( through ordinances). Therefore decision of the lower court is hereby reversed w/ cost against plaintiff.

Physical Theraphy Org. vs Mun. Board of Manila

Physical Theraphy Org. vs Mun. Board of Manila

Keyword: License Fee

Facts: Petitioner is an association of registered massagists and licensed operators of massage clinics in the city of manila and other parts of the country. They filed an action in the CFI of Manila for declaratory judgement regarding the validity of Mun. Ordinace No. 3659. Petitioner filed an injuction case. After the hearing the trial court dismissed the petition and later dissolved the writ of injuction. From this decision petitioner appealed said judgement directly to this court. Petitioners contend that the City of Manila is w/out authority to regulate the operation of massagist and the operation of massage clinic because under the New charter of Manila, RA 409, the Dir. of Health is the one who exercise supervision over the practice of massage clinics in the Phil. They also contends that the license fee of 100 pesos for operator in Sec.2 of the ordinance is unreasonable.

Issue: Whether or not City of manila committed garve abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and whether the license fee is unreasonable

Ruling: The Sc ruled that under the New Charter of City of Manila particularly Sec.18 it gives the legislative powers to the Mun.Board to enact all ordinance it may deem necessary and proper for the promotion of general welfare. This is generally referred to as  the General Welfare Clause. On the second contention of whether the license fee is unreasonable, The court ruled that said fee is made payable not by the massagist but the operator of a massage clinic. Said amount may appear to be large and unreasonable however much discreation is given to mun. corp. in determining the amount of said fees w/out considering it as a tax for revenue purposes but for regulatory purposes. The end sought to be attained in the ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic. Therefore said ordinance is valid.

PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

PBM Employees Org. vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973)

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Keywords: PREFERRED FREEDOM DOCTRINE

Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., with the officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration, informed the union panel that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable right granted by the Constitution, it should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company.  As such, they warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly, the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA (collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees) particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE’; and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.

Because the petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration, respondent Company charged the petitioners with a “violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ ”

In their answer, petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm.

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners, as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice were considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company.

Issue:

Whether the respondents’ act of concluding that the petitioners acted in bad faith for proceeding with the demonstration and expelling them from the company is unconstitutional.

Held:

No.  The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting government regulation only “with narrow specificity.”

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.  The condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.

The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has to be sustained.

There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid or protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.”  The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, “a potent means of inhibiting speech.”

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State “the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people,” which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that “the State shall afford protection to labor …”. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of “meaningless constitutional patter.” Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law “to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being.” It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d’etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism such as in the Republic Savings Bank vs CIR, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392

Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392

Nature: Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, seeking to enjoin respondent COMELEC from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

Keywords: BP 52 – An Act Governing the Election of Local Government Officials; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of guilt

Summary: SC – Ordered the case dismissed. 1^st paragraph of Section 4 of BP 52 is declared valid and 2^nd paragraph of said Section is declared null and void.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

Facts:

Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.  Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

On the other hand, petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.

 

 Issue:

Whether or not BP 52 Section 4 is unconstitutional

Held:

First paragraph of BP 52 Section 4 is valid. A portion of the second paragraph is declared null and void.

Ratio: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

 2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General of National Economic Development Authority, 487 SCRA 623

Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Director General of National Economic Development Authority, 487 SCRA 623

Nature: Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus

Keyword: Unified ID System, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, Right to privacy

CARPIO, J.: 

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.”  Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs.

Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format.  Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the “President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.”  The same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”    Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.

The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation.   Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.   Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. 90878, January 29, 1990

_{SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, G.R. 90878, January 29, 1990}

Nature: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press.

Keywords: Freedom of expression and of the press

Summary: Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 prohibits columnist, commentators, and announcers to use their column, radio, television time to campaign for or against plebiscite issues on the day before and during the day of plebiscite. A columnist named Pablito Sanidad filed a petition for prohibition and temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injuction against COMELEC claiming that the said provision violates his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.

MEDIALDEA, J.

Facts:

- On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION” was enacted into law;

- Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act;

- By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of which provides:

“Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.- During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”

- On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a columnist (“OVERVIEW”) for the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner claims that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same;

- On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167;

- On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881, he may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of resolution No. 2167 is violative of the constitutional freedom of expression and of the press

Held: YES. What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.

HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO  EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in a plebiscite.

While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the Organic Act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of Section 19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.