City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

Summary: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Gutierrez Jr., J.

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorises the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)

Velasco vs. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568 (1983)

Nature:  Declaratory relief

Keyword:  Barbershop, massage parlor in a separate room, constitutionality of Ordinance 4964

Summary: Petitioners assailed the validity of Ordinance 4964, prohibiting barbershop to conduct massaging customers in a separate room or in any room in the same building where the operator of the barbershop and the room of massaging is the same. The contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of livelihood without due process of law. Lower Court dismissed the petition for declaratory relief.

Facts: Petitioners herein are members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association. This is an appeal from the lower court's (LC) order dismissing their suit for declatory relief. They are challenging the constitutionality of Ord. No. 4964. They contend that it amounts to deprivation of properties and their means of livelihood without due process of law.

The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."

Respondent in its reply, said that the Ordinance No. 4964 is constitutional and such is just an exercise of the state's inherent power (police power).

Issue: Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violated the petitioner's right to property and their means of livelihood.

Held: Ordinance is Constitutional. Petition is dismissed, LC decision affirmed.

Enactment of such (Ordinance) is a valid exercise of Police Power.

The objectives of the Ordinance are:

(1) To impose payment of license fees for engaging in the business of massage clinics, and;

(2) To forestall possible immorality which might grow from the construction of a separate room for massaging customers.

This Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. And for that reason, the petitioners’ rights were not violated and they are not deprived of the due process of law.

Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983), DELA CRUZ vs. PARAS

Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) --- DELA CRUZ v PARAS

Dela Cruz v Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Fernando, CJ:

Facts:

1.  Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid,  tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2.  RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.'

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:

On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3.  As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, notprohibition.

4.   Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

Held: NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves  a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.

1.  The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2.   In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3.  Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

4.  Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182

Balacuit v. CFI, G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1988

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182

Title of the Case: Balacuit et al., v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City; G.R. No. L-38429; June 30, 1988

Nature: Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan

Keywords: Regulatory Ordinaces, 1/2 price of Movie tickets for Minors, Police Power by the local government

Summary: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for review.  Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.

GANCAYCO, J.

Facts: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and 12 years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid andconstitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

Ratio: It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way,to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face, the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Title of the Case: CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Keywords: Police Power, Hotel Business, Ermita-Malate area, taking of property without just compensation

TINGA, J.:

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Ratio: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Ruling: Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.