Churchill v Raffarty 32 Phil 580

Churchill v Raffarty 32 Phil 580

Churchill vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572

December 21, 1915

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Keywords: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power; Billboard removed

Summary:  Plaintiff Churchill and Tait put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province.

British and German Consuls complained that the billboard was rather offensive or a nuisance.

Act No. 2339 allows the Collector of Internal Revenue to collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. 

ISSUE: Whether the destruction or removal of any sign, signboard, or billboard which is offensive to the sight was a valid police power?

RULING: There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foregin to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would , without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute thier own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature.

Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general

TRENT, J.

Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339. 

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.”

Issue: Whether or not the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government.

Ratio: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.

"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law.”

"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction.”

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.”

"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well - recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power.

Ruling: For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the merits, with costs. So ordered.

Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659

Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court 148 SCRA 659

Nature: Review on Certiorari

Keywords: Requirements of due process; Fundamental Powers of the State: POLICE POWER

Summary: RTC - sustained confiscation of the carabaos; and decline to rule on the constitutionality of the EO for lack of authority. IAC - upheld RTC decision. SC - reversed CA decision.

CRUZ, J.

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos

Issue:

1.     Whether or not the said Executive Order is valid.

Ratio: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Note: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)

Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)

Nature: APPLICATION OF HABEAS CORPUS
Keywords: NON-CHRISTIAN, NATIVES, DELEGATED IN SPECIFIC AREAS, MADE REFERENCE TO A US CASE THAT INVOLVE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Summary: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered  by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of liberty and imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.

Held: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns. Action pursuant to Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws and confinement in accordance with the said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Doctrine: AMERICAN DECISIONS MAY IF APPLICABLE, BE CITED IN CASES BROUGHT TO OUR COURTS FOR DECISION

People of the Philippines vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, Aug. 12, 1992

People of the Philippines vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, Aug. 12, 1992

Keywords: invalid search and seizure, NPA, coerced into agreeing to search premises

Summary: Trial Court - finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866; SC - REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items.

After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza).

The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).

The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz.

Such information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damaso appealed.

Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house.

Ratio: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his house.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.

People of the Philippines vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, Jan. 18, 1991

People of the Philippines vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, Jan. 18, 1991

Nature: Appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Keywords: Found dried marijuana leaves in gift-wrapped packages open by a civillian; valid search

Summary: Special Criminal Court (RTC) - convicted Marti in violation of RA 6425; CA -

BIDIN, J.:

Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

Ratio: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC Case Digest (G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700)

POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC

G.R. Nos. 221697

& 221698-700

THE PETITION:

The petition is composed of two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following:

1.     DECEMBER  1, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SECOND DIVISION (Cancelled petitioner’s certificate of candidacy);

2.     DECEMBER 23, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

(Denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration); and

3.     DECEMBER 11, 2015 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

(Declared that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten 10 years and 11 months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

September 3, 1968		Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar. Custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife.
September 6, 1968		Emiliano Militar reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo).
1973		When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
May 13, 1974		The Poe spouses’ petition for adoption was granted by the trial court and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
December 13, 1986		Having reached the age of 18, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City.
April 4, 1988		Petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs
1988-1991		Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines but opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the U.S. in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill
July 27, 1991		Petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
July 29, 1991		Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S.
April16, 1992		Petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel
April 5, 1993		Renewed her Philippines passport.
May 19, 1998		Renewed her Philippines passport.
July 10, 1998		Petitioner gave birth to daughter Hanna MacKenzie.
October 18, 2001		Petitioner became a naturalized American citizen
April 8, 2004 – July 8, 2004		Petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika.
December 13, 2004 – February 3, 2005		Petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition who died shortly.
2005		Petitioner and husband began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
May 24, 2005		Petitioner came home to the Philippines and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
March 2006		The petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home.
July 7, 2006		Petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
July 18, 2006		The Bureau of Immigration acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship.
August 31, 2006		Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.
October 6, 2010		President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).
October 20, 2010		Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City.
October 21, 2010		Petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.
July 12, 2011		The petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States" and stated that she in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.
December 9, 2011		The U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.
October 2, 2012		The petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013."
October 15, 2015		Petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.

ISSUES:

1.     With regard to: a) being a foundling, and b) her repatriation, is the petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines? YES TO BOTH.

2.     Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as president? YES.

Did the petitioner commit material misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy? NO.

RATIONALE:

1.    Is petitioner a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

ON BEING A FOUNDLING:

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.  That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:

Sec. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond-shaped eyes and an oval face.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 15:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the

right to change his nationality.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings.

While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either.

ON PETITIONER’S REPATRIATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

According to the Supreme Court, the COMELEC's ruling disregarded consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:

…Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-bom Filipino.

Also, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson vs. HRET where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."

2.    Did the petitioner meet the 10-year residency requirement for running as president?

ON RESIDENCE

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have 10 years residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections.

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in

2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to

sell the family home).

The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay taken together, lead to no other conclusion that when she came here on May 24 2005, her intention was to permanently abandon the United States. Petitioner also actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005.

ON MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six (6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012.

Her explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is strengthened by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.

Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner.

CONCLUSION:

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.