Republic vs.
Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)
Nature:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
Keywords:
expropriation proceedings; taking of property; lessor/lessee
Facts:
After the owner of a parcel of land
that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend
the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the
assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the
property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings
begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the
government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential
elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely
(1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more
than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are
not present.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has
entered and occupied the property as lesse.
Ratio: No, the property was deemed
taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.
Ruling:
The
essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private
property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal
authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating
or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In
the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered
and occupied the property under a contract of lease.
In support of the assigned error that
the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties
under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case,
the Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the
year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and
appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege"
to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in
the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be
as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to
more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on
the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of
permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the
interest of national Security. 7
Appellee Castellvi, on the other
hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and
occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or
limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This
appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the
contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the
second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor
Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not
grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises
"at the value at the time of occupancy." 8
Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment
on the Republic's argument in support of the second error assigned, because as
far as she was concerned the Republic had not taken possession of her lands
prior to August 10, 1959. 9
In order to better comprehend the
issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the Castellvi property is concerned,
it should be noted that the Castellvi property had been occupied by the
Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease,
Taking' under the power of eminent
domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property for more than
a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority,
devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 13
Pursuant to the aforecited authority,
a number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property
for purposes of eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a
private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by
virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of
the property of Castellvi.
Second, the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period.
"Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's
duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596);
"lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life;
operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International
Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to
possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a
limited period" — not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease
contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry
on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The
fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a
permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was
transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by
consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement
the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the
same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is
claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
"intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the
lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the
parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant
case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud —
the question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the
language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525);
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to
judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention
of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's
property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why
was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic
itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same
time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air
base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate
the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much
less an implied notice — of such intention on the part of the Republic to
expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner,
nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court
(Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).
Third, the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in the
"taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because
the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted
to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to
public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the
AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property
for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the
Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did
not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the
Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and
by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return
the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic
was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals
until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It
is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for
purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947
when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find
merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the
"taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1)
that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the
owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
————
No. L-20620
August 15, 1974
Facts:
Philippine Government filed an
eminent domain case against the estate of Castellvi for a 760,000 sqm. Parcel
of land in Pampanga. Government alleged that the valuation should not be more
than 2000 pesos per sqm or a total of 259000 peso and prayed that the
provisional value should be set at that price. Castellvi contended that it is
actually worth 15 pesos per sqm or a total of 11,400,000.00. The alleged taking
started when the Government through the Philippine Air Force has been occupying
the lot under lease since 1947 but on 1956 Castellvi refused to renew lease
contract and opted to have the lot subdivided and sold to the public.
Government opposed since they introduced improvements to the lot worth 500,000
pesos.
The Government alleged that the
“taking” should be counted from 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement.
Castellvi insists that it should start from the time the lease contract had
expired on 1956. They filed the case on June 1959.
Issue:
Is the Government’s position
correct?
Held:
No. Castellvi is Correct.
Ratio:
First, the expropriator must enter
the property, which is admitted in this case.
Second, the entrance must be more
than a momentary period. In this case, the lease contract was renewable
annually. The entry on 1947 under lease was temporary and considered
transitory. Even if AFP constructed improvements, it does not alter the fact
that the entry was not permanent, in that it was meant to last only for a year.
Lease contract contained express provision that Government would return lot at
the end of the agreement. Express contract provision prevails over “intent” to
take.
Third, the public use must be in
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. In this case, the entry of the AFP into the property did not oust
Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Castellvi remained as owner during the lease period.
Neither is the Government’s
contention that the fact that the lease provision was year to year it had the
permanent right to occupy.
The determination of just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint
under Sec. 4, Rule 67. Government was placed in possession over the property
only on August 1959. The value should be based on June 1959, the date the case
was filed.
On the issue of the value of the
land, Government insists that the land is still agricultural land, hence should
be valued at around 20 centavos per sqm. However, the land has not been used
for agriculture since the occupation by the AFP. It was even declared under its
Tax declaration to be a residential lot of which they have been paying taxes.
The court valued the lot at 5 pesos per sqm instead of the 10 pesos per sqm as
declared by the Commissioners. SC decided this was the fair price.
On the issue of interest, 6%
interest is imposed beginning August 10, 1959 or the time the lot’s possession
was given to the Government.
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