Churchill v Raffarty 32 Phil 580

Churchill v Raffarty 32 Phil 580

Churchill vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572

December 21, 1915

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Keywords: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power; Billboard removed

Summary:  Plaintiff Churchill and Tait put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province.

British and German Consuls complained that the billboard was rather offensive or a nuisance.

Act No. 2339 allows the Collector of Internal Revenue to collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. 

ISSUE: Whether the destruction or removal of any sign, signboard, or billboard which is offensive to the sight was a valid police power?

RULING: There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foregin to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would , without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute thier own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature.

Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general

TRENT, J.

Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339. 

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.”

Issue: Whether or not the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government.

Ratio: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.

"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law.”

"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction.”

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.”

"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well - recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power.

Ruling: For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the merits, with costs. So ordered.

Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Bautista vs. Junio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Nature: Petition for review

Keywords: fundamental right vs police power, energy conservation measure, alleged violation of equal protection clause, LOI (Letter of Instruction)

Summary:             The constitutionality of LOI No. 869, which was a response to the protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on weekends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of legislative power.” Respondents denied the above allegations.

FERNANDO, C.J.

Facts: The President of the Philippines issued a Letter of Instruction No. 869 on May 31, 1979 in response to the protracted oil crisis that dated back to 1974. Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 39, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the specified vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. Spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique Bautista questioned the validity of the energy conservation measure through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. It was alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use private motor vehicles with H and EH plates is unfair, discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus in contravention of the equal protection clause. Moreover, for them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more specifically,” of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on week-ends and holidays." It would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 39 imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is likewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of "undue delegation of legislative power."

Issue: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.

Held: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty and property  for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

Ratio: The petition was dismissed because of the "presumption of constitutionality" or in slightly different words "a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations." There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court summed up the matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' "

In fact, the recital of the whereas clauses of the Letter of Instruction makes it clear that the substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, was not ignored, much less infringed. Furthermore, in the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.' "

Furthermore, the Court observed that there was no violation of equal protection. There was a situation that called for a corrective measure and LOI was the solution which for the President expressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. He decided that what was issued by him would do just that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. If it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President "is not required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none" (Lutz v. Araneta).

Absent, therefore, of the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted by unconstitutionality. The Memorandum Circular No. 39 was likewise considered valid for as long as it is limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment and it relates solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

Take Note:

The validity of an energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 186, issued on May 31, 1979 is upheld. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deal with the use of one’s property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. 

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 24693, July 31, 1967

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila, G.R. No. 24693, July 31, 1967

Title of the Case: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila

Nature: Review on certiorari

Keywords: Due Process, Police Power

Summary: RTC - ruled in favour of Petitioners and held that Ordinance 4760 is unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void. SC - affirmed RTC decision.

FERNANDO, J.

Facts: Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.

They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;  there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.

There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.

The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.

It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.

There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.

The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.

Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Ratio: No. "The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.”

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government.”

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.

Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.

In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.

Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.

The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.

What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.

On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."

Ruling: Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.

Note: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730

Nature:

•     Petitioners filed with the RTC: Petition for Declaratory Judgment and prohibition with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction. DENIED.

•       Filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari to set aside said order. DENIED.

Keywords: NMAT case. Police Power. Equal Protection Clause.

Summary: Petitioners sought admission into schools of medicine. However, petitioners did not pass the NMAT required by the Board of Medical Education.

Facts:  The petitioners sought to stop the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.

Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which provides that the cut-off score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every-year  by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cut-off score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious."

Issues: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional. 

Ratio: No.

Ruling: We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well-being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Notes:
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner: 

"SECTION 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines." 

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;

x xx 

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from saidapplicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;”

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools: 

"Admission requirements. — The medical college  may admit any student who has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.”

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cut off score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989)

Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521 (1989)

Nature: Class suit to declare RA 6675 unconstitutional

Keyword: Police Power, Philippine Medical Association, Generic Medicine, Generics Act of 1988, RA 6675

Summary: RA 6675 requiring the use of generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines. Petitioners, officers of Philippine Medical Association assailed the constitutionality of the said statute and petitioned for declaratory relief. Court treated it as petition for prohibition. Petitioner’s argument of the RA favouring private sector and giving the act of prescribing the correct medicine a duty of the salesgirl were all stricken down as misinterpretation of the RA.

Facts: Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No. 62.

The law specifically provides that “All government health agencies shall use generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and veterinary, private practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name.

The petitioner’s main argument is the alleged unequal treatment of government practitioners and those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.

In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctor’s prescription. The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their prices.

Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by the government.

Held: Petition Dismissed.

The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements the constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost”.

The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists and veterinarians on one hand and those in the private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law.

The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their corresponding process.

The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law. Without them, the law would be toothless.

The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are constitutional.

The purpose of the Generics Act is to “promote and require the use of generic drug products that are therapeutically equivalent to their brand name counterparts”. The effect of the drug does not depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it contains.

--

Generics Act of 1988 constitutional. RA 6675 secures the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. The respondent is implementing the constitutional mandate of the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost.”

Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

Title of the Case:  Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals

Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari

Keywords: Optical shop, Business Permit

Petitioner: Acebedo Optical Company, Inc.

Respondent: The Honorable Court of Appeals

Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It  cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits

Ratio: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995 REVERSED: and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's business permit in accordance with law and with this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.

Doctrine: The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community.  Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.

 Requisites

1 -    LAWFUL SUBJECT: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power

2 -    LAWFUL MEANS: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

Title of the Case: CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Keywords: Police Power, Hotel Business, Ermita-Malate area, taking of property without just compensation

TINGA, J.:

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Ratio: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments.

Ruling: Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.