NICOLAS-LEWIS, et al. vs. COMELEC

NICOLAS-LEWIS, et al (Petitioners) vs. COMELEC (Respondent)

G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. 9225). The Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 10, 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The COMELEC advised that the applicants do not have the right to vote in such elections because they lack the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution for regular voters. The COMELEC argued that dual citizens under the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act must first establish their domicile in the Philippines through positive acts before they can avail of themselves of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners and others who retained and / or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act.

HELD:

The Court granted the petition that those who retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225), may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting according to the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9189).

Section 5, Paragraph 1 of the R.A. 9225 states that “Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws.

There is no provision in the dual citizenship law requiring dual citizens to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, the law acknowledged that dual citizens are most likely non-residents and granted them the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act. The Overseas Absentee Voting Act, in essence, aims to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements, are qualified to vote as an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions.

OTHER RELEVANT LAWS:

Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non‑resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to its mandate, Congress enacted the Overseas Absentee Voting Act.

NOTE:

Though the petition was rendered moot and academic because the May 2004 elections had been concluded before a decision on the petition had been issued, the Court still took on the case because of the broader and transcendental issue in the petition, the propriety of allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections.

Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

Facts Of the Case:

For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386.

The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.7 However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-2468 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion, on the following premises:

·       The proposed land valuations were evaluated and analyzed using the joint appraisal report on fair market value of lands by Cuervo Appraisal, Inc., Development Bank of the Philippines, and the Land Bank of the Philippines and the fair market values established by the respective Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Zambales, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Bulacan as well as the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) of San Carlos and Cabanatuan.

·       For lot acquisition, adopt PAC or CUERVO Appraisal, whichever is lower; if there is a problem of acceptance, refer same to the Board;

·       For easement over agricultural lands, adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved; and

·       Always oppose any proposals for conversion of agricultural lands.

On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan against Maria and other landowners.

Maria San Pedro filed her Answer on February 2, 1998, alleging that there had already been an agreement as to the just compensation for her property. She prayed, among others, that she should be paid the consideration stated in the Right of Way Grant, P600.00 per sq m for the residential portion of the land as agreed upon by her and NPC, and to base the values from Resolution No. 97-00512 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee.

During the pre-trial on January 25, 1999, the parties agreed that the only issue for resolution was the just compensation for the property. The court appointed a committee of commissioners to ascertain and recommend to the trial court the just compensation for the properties.

On June 6, 2001, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the heirs and denied that of NPC. The RTC declared that the just compensation for the residential portion of the property should be the same as that of the spouses Lagula's property, which was P499.00 per sq m. On the claim of NPC in its motion for reconsideration that it should be made to pay only an easement fee, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 2076 should be treated the same way as NPC treated the properties of the spouses Lagula. It was pointed out that in the compromise agreements executed by plaintiff and spouses Lagula, plaintiff paid P499.00 per sq m on the basis of a straight sale of their agricultural land, and not merely an easement fee for a right of way thereon.

NPC appealed to the CA asserting that the lower court erred in its decision and prayed for modification.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner paid just compensation?

RULING:

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.39 To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion.40

In the July 12, 1999 Majority Report, the commissioners found that the property was located in a highly-developed area and was accessible through an all-weather road. The fact that the property had potential for full development as shown by the existence of building projects in the vicinity, and the long-term effect of the expropriation on the lives, comfort and financial condition of petitioners was likewise considered. The report also took into account the ocular inspection conducted by the commissioners on May 11, 1999. The tax declaration of the subject property,41 the NPC sketch plan,42 the location plan,43 the zoning certificates,44 the zonal valuation of the BIR,45 and the opinion values46 were also considered.

As had been amply explained by this Court in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay:

Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006

Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari

CARPIO, J.

Facts: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.

HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

NOTE:  Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. There exists real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.

Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, G.R. 164774, April 12, 2006

Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, G.R. 164774, April 12, 2006

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 73477 reversing the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter.

Summary: Company ban dating and relatives hired in the same company up to the 3rd degree. If an employee both in the same company decides to marry, one of them must resign their post as per company rules and regulation. SC - sided with the employees; company reasoning is in violation of the equal protection clause.

Facts:

Petitioners: Star Paper Corporation (Josephine Ongsitco - Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department & Sebastian Chua – Managing Director)

Respondents:Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella)

• Star Paper Corporation (COMPANY) has a company policy that was promulgated in 1995 states that:

1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.

2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.

• Ongsitco reminded the Respondents that should they decide to get married, one must resign.

Respondent’s Name            Date of Employment            Date of Marriage to co-employee            Date of Resignation

(Simbol)            27 Oct 1993            27 June 1998            20 June 1998

(Comia)            5 Feb 1997            1 June 2000            30 June 2000

(Estrella)            29 July 1994            X            21 December 1999

•Estrella met LuisitoZuñiga (Zuñiga), a married man and a co-worker. Zuñiga got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could’ve terminated her services due to immorality, but opted to resign on 21 Dec 1999.

•The respondents each signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement. They stated therein that they have no money and property accountabilities in the company and that they release the latter of any claim or demand of whatever nature.

• Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily; they were compelled to resign in view of an illegal company policy.

• Estrella alleges that she had a relationship with co-worker Zuñiga who misrepresented himself as a married but separated man. After he got her pregnant, she discovered that he was not separated. Thus, she severed her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to the company policy

• 30 November 1999: Estrella met an accident and was advised by the doctor to recuperate for 21 days.

• 21 Dec 1999: She returned to work but was denied entry. She was then given a memorandum which stated that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth month pay.

• They filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorney’s fees.

• 31 May 2001, Labor Arbiter del Rosario dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

• 11 January 2002: On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

• 8 August 2002: A resolution denying the MR of respondents was released. Thereafter, they appealed through a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

• 3 August 2004: The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision  and declared the petitioners’ dismissal from employment illegal and ordered the Company to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal until actual reinstatement; andto pay petitioners attorney’s fees amounting to 10% of the award and the cost of the suit.

Issue: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative

Ruling:

Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.

It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage between the respondent and their spouse could be detrimental to its business operations.

The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislature’s silence, that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic.Thus, reinstating both to their posts.

As for Estrella, the court found that the petitioners contention that she was pressured to resign because she got impregnated by a married man and she could not stand being looked upon or talked about as immoral, incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassment and humiliation, she would not have gone back to work at all. Nor would she have filed a suit for illegal dismissal and pleaded for reinstatement. We have held that in voluntary resignation, the employee is compelled by personal reason(s) to dissociate himself from employment. It is done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act of abandonment. Given the lack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation was voluntary, Estrella’s dismissal is declared illegal.