Showing posts with label Estafa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Estafa. Show all posts

Monday, May 27, 2019

Lim vs. Kou Co Ping


LIM VS KOU CO PING

Facts:
FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for P3.15 million (P63.00 per bag). Co then sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim at the price of P64.00 per bag (total of P3.2 million). Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities (covering 10,000 bags) to Co. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before the RTC of Pasig City. Lim also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC of Manila.

Issue:
Whether or not Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa

Held:
No. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender  (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.”

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

In this case, the first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Hannah Eunice D. Serana vs. Sandiganbayan


HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA v SANDIGANBAYAN
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

Nature: Petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
Keyword: ESTAFA, Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Facts: Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.

Issue:  Whether the petitioner can be charged of estafa in the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling:

Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D.  No.  1606. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.  Also the Sandiganbayan see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D.  No.  1606.  Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies.  The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.  No.  1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vs Desierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

Monday, January 22, 2018

Garcia vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 144785, Sept. 11, 2003


Garcia vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 144785, Sept. 11, 2003

Nature:  Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, which found petitioner Yolanda Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P87,000.00, and to pay the costs.

Keywords:  Estafa, vegetable dealer, bouncing cheques,

Summary:  For more than a year, petitioner had been buying assorted vegetables from Dolores Apolonio in Divisoria, Manila. Petitioner always paid in cash. However, in May 1995, petitioner thrice bought vegetables from Apolonio using three checks: one postdated June 20, 1995 for P28,000.00, drawn by her husband, Manuel Garcia; the second postdated July 25, 1995 for P34,000.00, drawn by her daughter Gigi Garcia; and the third postdated August 15, 1995 for P25,000.00, drawn by her nephew Jose Nadongga Jr. When the three checks were presented for payment, they were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:  That on or about and during the period comprised between June 20, 1995, and August 15, 1995, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which she made to said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to the effect that accused has three (3) checks which according to her have sufficient funds and if encashed, the same will not be dishonored; and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to accept the following checks:

Name of Bank Check No. Amount Date Payable to

Phil Natl Bank 046884 P28,000.00 6-20-95 Cash
-do- 047416 34,000.00 8-15-95 -do-
Pilipinas Bank 60042087 25,000.00 7-25-95 Garcia
Vegetable Dealer

as payments of assorted vegetables which accused purchased and received from said DOLORES S. APOLONIO in the total amount of P87,000.00, said accused knowing fully well that the said manifestations and representations were all false and untrue as said checks when presented to the bank for payment were all dishonored for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain assorted vegetables in the amount of P87,000.00; which once in her possession and with intent to defraud, she willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said assorted vegetables or the value thereof to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P87,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Issue:  WON Petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was violated because, although she was charged with estafa under Article 315, Section 2[a], as amended, which penalizes false manifestations or fraudulent representations in defraudation of another, she was instead convicted of estafa under Article 315, Section 2[d] which penalizes the issuance of postdated checks that were not funded or were insufficiently funded.

Held:  NO.

Ratio:  Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 thereof provides that the Information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes.

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code provides that swindling or estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud is committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by other similar deceits. The elements of estafa under this penal provision are: (1) the accused defrauded another by means of deceit; and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third party.

A careful reading of the Information clearly shows that petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Information alleged that petitioner by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations x x x to the effect that accused has three checks which according to her have sufficient funds and if encashed the same will not be dishonored; x x x induced x x x Dolores S. Apolonio to accept the following checks x x x as payment of assorted vegetables x x x in the total amount of P87,000.00.

There is, however, no basis for petitioner to conclude that she was convicted for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code which penalizes any person who shall defraud another by postdating or issuing a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of check. The elements of this form of estafa are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.

While the typographical error in the dispositive portion of the trial courts decision did not help in clearing this matter by saying that, x x x the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, Sec. 2(2) of the Revised Penal Code, x x x,[9] the body of the trial courts decision clearly discusses the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), thus:

The elements of estafa are (1) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) that the damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party.

In other words, whether petitioner was charged under either paragraph 2(a) or 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, she would still be guilty of estafa because damage and deceit, which are essential elements of the offense, have been established with satisfactory proof. The fraudulent act was committed prior to or simultaneous with the issuance of the bad check. The guarantee and the simultaneous delivery of the checks by petitioner were the enticement and the efficient cause of the defraudation committed against Apolonio who suffered damage amounting to P87,000.00 as a result of the fraud committed by petitioner in paying him underfunded checks drawn by three different persons.

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidences justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a specie of fraud.

In fact, the Court of Appeals saw through petitioners deceit when it observed, thus:

Appellants scheme is obvious. She wanted to get vegetables from Apolonio for free. In order to escape from any criminal liability, she asked her husband, daughter and nephew to issue the bouncing checks. And certainly, the scheme was deceitful. The appellant could not have been unaware of the insufficient funds of her relatives to support the checks they issued but she tendered the checks to Apolonio with the assurance that they were funded. Appellant could have exerted efforts to settle her account upon notice of the dishonored checks if she were in good faith.

Ruling:  WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial court finding Yolanda Garcia guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2[a] of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P87,000.00. With costs.

Republic vs Pasig Rizal

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PASIG RIZAL CO., INC. [ G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022 ] EN BANC Petitioner : Republic of the Philippine...

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