Lim vs. Kou Co Ping

LIM VS KOU CO PING

Facts:

FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for P3.15 million (P63.00 per bag). Co then sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim at the price of P64.00 per bag (total of P3.2 million). Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities (covering 10,000 bags) to Co. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed.

An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before the RTC of Pasig City. Lim also filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC of Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa

Held:

No. A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender  (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.”

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.

In this case, the first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the obligations arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

Castillo vs Salvador

GR No. 191240,      July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR

Facts:

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO - Filed the instant petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that even if the Court Of Appeals decided to acquit respondent it should have at least retained the award of damages to the petitioner.

-      It was alleged that respondent along with his brother proposed a remittance business with the petitioner.

-      The amount of US$100,000.00 was the capital which was raised by the petitioner. However, it was alleged that the respondent took the said amount to pay for all his obligations. Said amount was never returned to the petitioner.

PHILLIP R. SALVADOR - Charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. 

-      Denied the charges against him.

-      The Court ruled for his acquittal. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

Issue: WON the award of damages or the civil aspect of the case can be retained.

Held:

     The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is “for the same act or omission.

      A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

     In the present case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.

     In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.

The petition for the award of damages is denied.

Union Bank vs. People

Union Bank vs. People

G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012

Nature of the case: PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 65

Venue

Facts:

Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint and second complaint were filed in RTC Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Information filed in RTC Makati alleged that Tomas executed under oath false affidavit against forum shopping.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

 

RTC denied the motion.

Issue:

What the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be—Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.

Ruling:

The venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place.

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.  The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City.

For the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed.

Miguel vs Sandiganbayan

Miguel vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 172035               

July 4, 2012

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioner, a former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal City, was charged with violation of Sec. 13 of RA 3019 in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City public market.

The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: “..former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused]..”

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.

ISSUE: Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid

HELD:

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.    

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.

Ramiscal vs Sandiganbayan

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR. vs.  SANDIGANBAYAN

CALLEJO, SR., J

G.R. Nos. 140576-99 | December 13, 2004

Nature:  Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

Keyword: Jurisdiction

FACTS: The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) is a government-owned or controlled corporation. It was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system. Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.

On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a "Complaint-Affidavit" with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate Ramiscal, Jr. (President of the AFP-RSBS), together with twenty-seven (27) other persons for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.

On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice of Appearance" as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof. In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS.

ISSUE: Whether or not AGFOI as represented by Albano & Associates are private injured parties entitled to intervene as the private prosecutor in the subject cases.

RULING: We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Under Section 5, Rule 110  of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.

On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.50 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:

ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:

1. Restitution;

2. Reparation of the damage caused;

3. Indemnification for consequential damages.

Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.

Hannah Eunice D. Serana vs. Sandiganbayan

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA v SANDIGANBAYAN

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

Nature: Petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

Keyword: ESTAFA, Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Facts: Hannah Serana was appointed by former President Estrada as a student regent of UP Cebu, to serve a one-year term. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The Ombudsman filed estafa case against her before the Sandiganbayan. She moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent because the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; the petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; and the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government. As to jurisdiction over her person, she contends that as a UP student regent, she is not a public officer who held the position in an ex officio capacity.

Issue:  Whether the petitioner can be charged of estafa in the Sandiganbayan?

Ruling:

Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D.  No.  1606. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.  Also the Sandiganbayan see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D.  No.  1606.  Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies.  The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.  No.  1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vs Desierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.