Miguel vs Sandiganbayan

Miguel vs Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 172035               

July 4, 2012

FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

FACTS:

The petitioner, a former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal City, was charged with violation of Sec. 13 of RA 3019 in connection with the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal City public market.

The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads: “..former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused]..”

The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.

ISSUE: Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid

HELD:

In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules) requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.    

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.