Showing posts with label Right to Counsel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Right to Counsel. Show all posts

Monday, January 22, 2018

Delgado vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357


Delgado vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 357

Nature:  This is a petition for Certiorari and mandamus with prayer for a Writ of preliminary injunction

Keywords:  counsel who represented the accused in not member of the bar; Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents; right to counsel

Summary:  Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgados waiver of her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and the CA sustained the lower courts rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is not a member of the IBP.

PARAS, J.

Facts:  Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and Catalino Bautista alias Atty. Paulino Bautista, the last named still at large, was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the United States.

All the accused (except Catalino Bautista) pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and trial on the merits ensued. Herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco. On December 13, 1973, the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, said Atty. Yco failed to appear despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on the ground allegedly that he was sick. No medical certificate was however submitted. The trial fiscal objected, believing that the motion was dilatory because there had been numerous postponements in the past at petitioner's behest. The trial Court sustained the fiscal's objection thereto, considered Emma Delgado to have waived presentation of her evidence, and considered the case submitted for decision.

Thereafter, a judgment of conviction was rendered by the trial court and finds the accused Gloria C. Tortona, Emma R. Delgado and Celia Capistrano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public and/or Official Documents. Each is further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, said complainant moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, and one fourth of the costs of the proceedings.

Accused Gloria C. Tortona did not appeal from the aforesaid decision. Accused Celia Capistrano and petitioner Emma R. Delgado appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not on the basis of the evidence and the law the judgment appealed from should be maintained."

Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court.

On December 27, 1976, an entry of final judgment was issued and on February 1, 1977, the records of the case were remanded to the lower court for execution of judgment.

Believing that there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision as petitioner was not informed or notified of said decision by her counsel on record, Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, herein petitioner filed on February 17, 1977 with respondent Court of Appeals an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, to Recall the Records and Allw the Movant to Personally Receive Copy of the Decision.

This motion was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated April 20, 1977.

On May 11, 1977 an Order was issued by respondent Court of First Instance of Manila directing the arrest of herein petitioner Emma R. Delgado and the confiscation of her bond for failure to appear at the execution of judgment on May 11, 1977.

On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the newly discovered fact that petitioner came to know for the first time only on May 19, 1977 that Atty. Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed that she be granted a new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel.

On June 3, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, hence, she filed the instant petition before this Court.

The main thrust of petitioner's arguments is that she is entitled to a new trial and therefore, all the assailed orders of respondent courts should be vacated and set aside, because her "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.

Issue:  WON petitioner is entitled to a new trial and therefore, all the assailed orders of respondent courts should be vacated and set aside, because her "lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.

Held:  YES. We find the petition impressed with merit

Ratio:  This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.

Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered, remanding the case to the trial court for new trial.

Doctrine: – The mistake of counsel will bind his client. The only exception is when the counsel represents himself as a lawyer and is not one because in that case the accused is denied of his right to counsel and due process.

United States vs. Ash, 413 U.S. 300


United States vs. Ash, 413 U.S. 300

Nature:  CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Keywords:  Right to counsel at a post indictment photographic lineup

Summary:  A number of informants were asked to identify a number of suspects in connection with a bank robbery. The respondent, Ash (the “respondent”), challenged the identification because counsel was not present at what was arguably a critical stage of the prosecution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An accused does not have the right to counsel at a post indictment photographic lineup

BLACKMUN, J.

Facts:  Charles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ashs counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ashs Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.

Details:

       2 men robbed a bank in Washington, DC with stockings over their faces, and the men escaped through an alleyway
       A govt. informant told the authorities that D had discussed the robbery with him
       FBI showed the 4 witnesses 5 B&W photos, including D's photo, and all 4 identified D
       In preparation for trial 3 years later, an FBI agent & a prosecutor showed the 4 witnesses 5 color photos, and only 3 of the 4 witnesses were able to identify D; the 4th was unable to make a selection

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

       Trial judge held that the govt. had shown by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court IDs would be based on observation of the suspect other than at the photo lineups
       3 witnesses testified but they refused to say that they were certain in their IDs -- none made an in-court ID of D's accomplice
       The 4th W made positive in-court IDs of D and his accomplice, even though he had not been able to ID the accomplice in the color photos
       Ct. App. reversed, holding that D's 6th Amdt. right to counsel was violated when his atty was not present at the photo lineup


Issue:  Whether the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution grants an accused the right to have counsel present at a post indictment photographic identification procedure?

Held:  No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 7-3 majority, reversed the court of appeals and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to counsel for photographic displays held for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. A photographic display is different from a line up, because the accused is not present and is not in danger of being misled or overpowered by the opposing attorney. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, stating that pretrial photographic displays are not a critical stage of prosecution. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that there is no meaningful difference between a pretrial lineup and a pretrial photo identification, so the right to counsel should extend in both circumstances. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Ruling:  reversed and remanded.

Doctrine: – Syllabus

The Sixth Amendment does not grant an accused the right to have counsel present when the Government conducts a post-indictment photographic display, containing a picture of the accused, for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. A pretrial event constitutes a "critical stage" when the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems or help in meeting his adversary. Since the accused is not present at the time of the photographic display, and, as here, asserts no right to be present, there is no possibility that he might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.

United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, distinguished. Pp. 413 U. S. 306-321.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PASIG RIZAL CO., INC. [ G.R. No. 213207. February 15, 2022 ] EN BANC Petitioner : Republic of the Philippine...

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