Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392
Nature: Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, seeking to enjoin respondent COMELEC from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
Keywords: BP 52 – An Act Governing the Election of
Local Government Officials; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of guilt
Summary: SC – Ordered the case dismissed. 1st
paragraph of Section 4 of BP 52 is declared valid and 2nd paragraph
of said Section is declared null and void.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
Facts:
Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a
former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same
office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides,
among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to
run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation
hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the
eye of the law.
On the other hand, petitioner,
Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as
such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the
land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified
voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. The suits of Igot and Salapantan
are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding
the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the
provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for
public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere
filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already
disqualify them from office.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 52 Section 4
is unconstitutional
Held:
First paragraph of BP 52 Section 4
is valid. A portion of the second paragraph is declared null and void.
Ratio: Explicit is the
constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from
running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed
against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no
distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have
been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the
accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of
the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although
the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged
with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of
acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings
between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged,
will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being
infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of
only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first
portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which
can stand by itself.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, 1) the
first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10
of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in
existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the
elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective
provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local
office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a
civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact",
is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
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