Monday, January 29, 2018

Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392


Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 96 SCRA 392

Nature: Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, seeking to enjoin respondent COMELEC from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

Keywords: BP 52 – An Act Governing the Election of Local Government Officials; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of guilt

Summary: SC – Ordered the case dismissed. 1st paragraph of Section 4 of BP 52 is declared valid and 2nd paragraph of said Section is declared null and void.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

Facts:
Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.  Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
On the other hand, petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
 
 Issue:
Whether or not BP 52 Section 4 is unconstitutional

Held:
First paragraph of BP 52 Section 4 is valid. A portion of the second paragraph is declared null and void.
Ratio: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

 2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

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