Sheppard v. Maxwell

Sheppard v. Maxwell

U.S. Supreme Court

Sheppard v. Maxwell,

384 U.S. 333 (1966)

No. 490

Argued February 28, 1966

Decided June 6, 1966

384 U.S. 333

Nature: Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

Keywords: Prejudicial Publicity; fair trial; second-degree murder of wife; doctor; Ohio

Summary: After suffering a trial court conviction of second-degree murder for the bludgeoning death of his pregnant wife, Samuel Sheppard challenged the verdict as the product of an unfair trial. Sheppard, who maintained his innocence of the crime, alleged that the trial judge failed to protect him from the massive, widespread, and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution.

The United States District Court held that he was not afforded a fair trial and granted the writ subject to the State's right to put Sheppard to trial again

The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision by a divided vote

United States Supreme Court: Granted certiorari and concluded that Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the CA.

Decided by: MR. JUSTICE CLARK

Facts: In 1954, Cleveland-area physician Sam Sheppard was arrested for the murder of his pregnant wife Marilyn. Before the trial, the media was accused of bias against Sheppard and inflammatory coverage of the case, and was criticized for immediately labeling Sheppard as the only viable suspect. Cleveland papers published the names and photographs of the jurors, opening them to outside influence. Trial judge Edward Blythin denied defense motions to move the trial out of Cleveland or postpone it until the publicity died down. Despite his claims of innocence and what some saw as a lack of physical evidence, the jury found Sheppard guilty of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison.

Sheppard attempted to appeal his case on the grounds that he received an unfair trial due to the influence of the media on the jurors. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in 1966.

The national, Ohio, and Greater Cleveland ACLU organizations joined together to file an amicus brief supporting Sheppard’s claims. Bernard A. Berkman, chair of the Greater Cleveland chapter, along with Sheppard’s lawyer, F. Lee Bailey, argued the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of his wife because of the trial judge's failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution.

Held: The court found that Sheppard had been denied due process and reversed his murder conviction. The decision noted that “the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom.”

Ratio: The court's fundamental error is compounded by the holding that it lacked power to control the publicity about the trial. From the very inception of the proceedings the judge announced that neither he nor anyone else could restrict prejudicial news accounts. And he reiterated this view on numerous occasions. Since he viewed the news media as his target, the judge never considered other means that are often utilized to reduce the appearance of prejudicial material and to protect the jury from outside influence. We conclude that these procedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial and so do not consider what sanctions might be available against a recalcitrant press nor the charges of bias now made against the state trial judge.

The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court. As we stressed in Estes, the presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged.  Bearing in mind the massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of the courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel requested. The number of reporters in the courtroom itself could have been limited at the first sign that their presence would disrupt the trial. They certainly should not have been placed inside the bar. Furthermore, the judge should have more closely regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom. For instance, the judge belatedly asked them not to handle and photograph trial exhibits lying on the counsel table during recesses.

The court should have insulated the witnesses. All of the newspapers and radio stations apparently interviewed prospective witnesses at will, and in many instances disclosed their testimony. A typical example was the publication of numerous statements by Susan Hayes, before her appearance in court, regarding her love affair with Sheppard. Although the witnesses were barred from the courtroom during the trial the full verbatim testimony was available to them in the press. This completely nullified the judge's imposition of the rule.

The court should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides. Much of the information thus disclosed was inaccurate, leading to groundless rumors and confusion.

The fact that many of the prejudicial news items can be traced to the prosecution, as well as the defense, aggravates the judge's failure to take any action.  Effective control of these sources - concededly within the court's power - might well have prevented the divulgence of inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations that made up much of the inflammatory publicity, at least after Sheppard's indictment.

Ruling: Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom, we must reverse the denial of the habeas petition. The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to issue the writ and order that Sheppard be released from custody unless the State puts him to its charges again within a reasonable time.

Note: The decision also noted the balance between the First Amendment’s freedom of the press and the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial: “Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.”

Sheppard was granted another trial in 1966, and was found not guilty.