Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She

G.R. No. L-17587             September 12, 1967

CASTRO, J.

Parties of the Case:

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, (plaintiff-appellant)

LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng, deceased, (defendant-appellant)

Keyword: Leasing, lease for 50 years, lease for 99 years

Summary: Justina Santos leased her land in favor of Wong for 50 years and an option to sell it to him once he acquired philippine citizenship.

Facts: Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of land in Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property, paying a monthly rental of P2,620.

On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then by the visits of Wong's four children who had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. Wong also took care of the payment; in her behalf, of taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her household expenses.

Justina Santos then executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement.

On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.

In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.

Issue: Whether or not the contracts with Wong were valid

Held: NO.

Ratio: the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

            But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it— rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She) is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been vacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant.

Doctrine: Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is against a constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null and void.

Cheesman vs Intermediate Appelate Court

G.R. No. 74833             January 21, 1991

NARVASA, J.

Parties of the Case:

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN (petitioner)

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA (respondents)

Keyword: american citizen, lack of consent of foreigner spouse of the sale of Philippine property, prohibition of barring foreigners to own property in the philippines

Summary: petitioner (an American citizen) and Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later registered in the latter’s name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third person without the knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioner’s) intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null and void.

Facts: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been separated since February 15,1981.1

On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ." Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.

Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by him—tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants.

On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman. The deed described Criselda as being " . . . of legal age, married to an American citizen,. . ."

Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. An answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith.

CFI: Declared that the sale executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Padilla is void ab initio  and ordering the delivery of the property to thomas cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property.

Trial Court’s summary judgment: the sale between Criselda Cheesman and Padilla is valid. Thomas Cheesman’s complaint is dismissed and is ordered to immediately turn over the possession of the hous and lot to Padilla.

IAC: Found all of Thomas Cheesman’s contention to be without merit. IAC affirmed summary judgment having found no reversible error.

Issue: Whether or not Thomas Cheesman has a right over the alleged conjugal property sold by his Filipino Wife without his consent despiite him being an American Citizen.

Held: No.

Ratio: the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ramirez vs. Vda De Ramirez

Ramirez vs. Vda De Ramirez

G.R. No. L-27952            February 15, 1982

ABAD SANTOS, J.

Parties of the Case:

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, Administratrix (petitioner-appellee)

MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ (legatees, oppositors- appellants)

Keyword: usufruct land in favor of a foreigner as stated in the Filipino’s will

Facts: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow (a French national living in Paris) as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965 by Maria Luisa Palacios who was appointed administratrix of the estate. The principal beneficiaries are as follows: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda (An Austrian living in Spain).

Issue:

Whether or not the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution

Held: No. It is not violative of the Constitution.

Ratio: The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)

The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of land.

This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Ruling: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows:

One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.

The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED

Yap vs. Cruz

Yap vs. Cruz

G.R. No. 89307, May 8, 1992

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Parties of the Case:

DR. MA. WENDELYN V. YAP, EVELIA H. BADIAGAN, TERESITA A. BALADAD and FLORENCIA C. DE VERA (petitioners)

DR. VERGEL G. CRUZ, THE HON. MARCELO R. OBIEN, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 44, and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (respondents)

Nature: This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for review and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 44 in which in turn affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 113298.

Keywords: tenant, malate veterinary clinic, forcible entry, new lease contract

Summary: Dr. Cruz is a tenant in good standing and offered in good will the sale of his veterinary clinic to Dr. Yap, thus introducing him to the landowners during negotiations. When the said sale failed to marterialize, Dr. Yap and the Landlord came into an agreement to lease the property to the former without notice to Dr. Cruz who was at the time the current lease holder. Dr. Cruz then filed an action for Forcivle Entry with Damages.

MTC, RTC, CA: Decided in favor of Dr. Cruz

Facts:

Dr. Vergel G. Cruz, the private respondent in this case was the bonafide tenant of Amado Q. Bugayon, Jr. for almost five years in the premises in question just before this controversy started. He religiously paid the monthly rentals of P1,400.00, introduced several improvements and operated a veterinary clinic known as Malate Veterinary Clinic. Sometime in the latter part of July, 1985, he offered for sale the goodwill of the veterinary clinic and some of its equipment to Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap, Evelia H. Badiagan, Teresita A. Baladad and Florencia C. de Vera, the petitioners herein. During the period of negotiations, private respondent Cruz introduced to the landlord Dr. Wendelyn V. Yap at the person interested in taking over the clinic. However, the negotiations did not materialize but the petitioners managed to enter into a contract of lease for the said premises at a monthly rental of P1,800.00 with the landlord. As a result, private respondent Cruz brought an action for "Forcible Entry with Damages" with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 against petitioners herein and the landlord.

MTC: rendered its decision in favor of private respondent Cruz, the dispositive portion of which states: defendant to vacate the premises and surrender possession to the plaintiff, and the landlord to pay damages

RTC: affirmed the decision of the MTC

CA: dismissed the petition for review of petitioners and affirmed the decision of the RTC

Issue: WON the CA erred in ruling that the lower courts were correct in their decision that the petitioners must vacate the premises and turn over the possession thereof to the private respondent despite the fact that the private respondent had already failed and refused to pay for the rentals thereof, thus, did not have any right thereto, and the petitioners had a valid lease agreement thereof with the owner of the premises

HELD:

We rule in favor of private respondent. When the petitioners and the landlord executed a new contract of lease, the lease of private respondent was still valid and subsisting. There is no question that private respondent has not effectively relinquished his leasehold rights over the premises in question in view of the failure of negotiations for the sale of the goodwill. Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in nature and has no force and effect if the condition is not complied with.

True, the lease of private respondent is on a month-to-month basis and may be terminated at the end of any month after proper notice or demand to vacate has been given (Rivera v. Florendo, G.R. No. 60066, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 278; Zablan v. CA, G.R. No. 57844, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 487; Uy Hoo and Sons Realty Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 83263, June 14, 1989, 174 SCRA 100; Palanca v. IAC, G.R. No. 71566, December 15, 1989, 180 SCRA 119). In the case at bar, however, the lack of proper notice or demand to vacate upon the private respondent is clearly evident. In the absence of such notice, the lease of private respondent continues to be in force and can not be deemed to have expired as of the end of the month automatically. Neither can the non-payment of the rent for the month of August, 1985 be a ground for termination of the lease without a demand to pay and to vacate. The instant case can easily be differentiated from the case of Vda. de Kraut v. Lontok, G.R. No. L-18374, February 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 281, which was cited by petitioners in support of their contention that a lease on a month-to-month basis may be terminated at the end of any month and shall be deemed terminated upon the lessee's refusal to pay the increased rental because here there was neither demand on the part of the landlord to pay the rental nor refusal on the part of the private respondent to pay the same as in fact he made a tender of his rental payment in the latter part of August, 1985. Thus, when the landlord and the petitioners entered into a new contract of lease effectively depriving the private respondent of his lease, they were clearly guilty of forcible entry in view of the subsisting lease of private respondent.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Rey Carlo Rivera vs. Virgilio Rivera

Rey Carlo Rivera vs. Virgilio Rivera

Gr. No. 154203, July 8, 2003

Puno, J.

Parties of the Case:

Rey Carlo A. Rivera and Gladys Abaga Rivera (petitioner)

Virgilio Rivera (respondent)

Nature: Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners assail the March 21, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in connection with an ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 7529, ordering them to vacate the disputed premises and pay rentals.

Keywords:  ejectment case, unlawful detainer,

Facts: The subject of the dispute is a 228-square meter lot with a two-storey duplex house located in Pasig City. The property was originally owned by spouses Remigio Rivera, Sr. and Consuelo Rivera. The spouses had eleven (11) children, two of whom were Remigio, Jr. (petitioners' father) and respondent Virgilio Rivera.

In 1974, when the spouses migrated to the United States, they asked their son Remigio, Jr. and his children (two of whom are petitioners Rey Carlo and Gladys Rivera) to occupy one unit of the duplex house without payment of rentals. In 1985, respondent, another son of the spouses, moved into the other unit of the duplex house and likewise occupied it gratuitously.

After Remigio, Sr. died in 1992, his widow Consuelo and their eleven (11) children executed an extrajudicial settlement1 where the children voluntarily waived their hereditary rights to four (4) real properties owned by their parents, including the lot with the duplex house, in favor of their mother Consuelo.

In 1993, Remigio, Jr. together with his three (3) sons migrated to the United States, leaving behind petitioners who continued to reside in one of the units of the duplex house. Respondent likewise migrated to the U.S.

On April 6, 1999, Consuelo sold the duplex house and lot to respondent for five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).2 At the time of the sale, both Consuelo and respondent were residing in the same house in San Jose, California. In the Deed of Sale, Consuelo and respondent were represented by respondent's daughters Ma. Theresa R. Ferreria and Ma. Dolores A. Rivera. Title to the property was subsequently transferred in the name of respondent.

Respondent, represented by his daughter Dolores, asked petitioners to sign a lease contract over the unit of the duplex house they were occupying, covering the period from April 30, 1999 to June 30, 1999, with a monthly rental of P6,000.00.

As the petitioners refused to sign the lease contract or vacate the premises, respondent,3 through his daughter Dolores, filed an unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 7529) against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City. In the complaint,4 it was alleged: that respondent is the registered owner of the duplex house; that he merely tolerated petitioners' occupancy of one of the units thereof, conditioned upon the execution of the lease contract between the parties; that petitioners initially agreed thereto as they claimed they would remain in the unit only for a few more months; and that after respondent caused the preparation of the lease contract, petitioners refused to sign it or vacate the property.

In their Answer with counterclaim,5 petitioners alleged that the deed of sale between Consuelo and Virgilio Rivera was fictitious. They claimed that their occupancy of the premises was not by mere tolerance as they have a right to occupy it as co-owners. Hence, they averred that they could not be compelled to pay rentals for the use of the property. Petitioners likewise raised the affirmative defense that respondent had no cause of action against them as no title was conferred to him because: the deed of sale was fictitious; the subject property was part of the conjugal property of Remigio, Sr. and Consuelo and after the former's death, all the compulsory heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement transferring all the conjugal properties to Consuelo out of love and respect for her; Consuelo and all the compulsory heirs have migrated to the States; Consuelo was living with respondent in the States; Consuelo and respondent hid from the other heirs the transfer of the subject property to respondent; the deed of sale was executed in the Philippines through a special power of attorney granted by respondent to his daughters, Ma. Theresa Rivera-Ferreria and Ma. Dolores Rivera; assuming that the sale was legitimate, Consuelo did not notify petitioners thereof, with deliberate intent and bad faith to disinherit her grandchildren, petitioners herein, in violation of their right of first refusal, having resided in the premises since birth, or for more than 20 years; the P500,000 consideration for the sale was clearly inadequate; assuming that the sale was valid, it nonetheless deprived the other compulsory heirs of their share over the subject property; and with the attendant defects in the sale of the property, no right or title was transferred to respondent.

MeTC: rendered judgment in the ejectment case in favor of respondent

Appeal to the RTC: Reversed the decision of the MeTC and rule in favor of petitioner

CA: Reversed the RTC decision and reinstated the original decision of the MeTC. It held that as registered owner of the land, respondent is entitled to possession thereof.

Issue:

: (a) whether petitioners, being in actual physical possession of the property since 1974, are entitled to continue in possession of the premises until the issue of ownership thereof is resolved by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) whether Civil Case No. 7529, the ejectment case, is beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court; (c) whether respondent holds the subject property in trust for the legitimate heirs at the time the ejectment case was filed; and (d) whether petitioners, who are in actual physical possession of the premises, exercised the right of a co-owner in representation of their father, Remigio Rivera, Jr.

Held: We find no merit in the petition.

Ratio: We cannot sustain petitioners' contention that as they had actual, physical possession of the property as co-owners, in representation of their father Remigio, Jr., they are entitled to remain in the premises. In an unlawful detainer case, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that he shows that he has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases, not in unlawful detainer cases where the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.8 Thus, the fact that petitioners were in prior physical possession of the duplex unit does not automatically entitle them to continue in said possession and does not give them a better right to the property.

In the case at bar, the lower court properly adjudicated ownership of the property to respondent in the unlawful detainer case on the basis of his title thereto. Full ownership of the subject property was surrendered to Consuelo Rivera upon the death of Remigio, Sr. through an extrajudicial partition signed by all the compulsory heirs. Thus, Consuelo had every right to dispose of the property as she deemed fit. Moreover, the lower court correctly ruled that petitioners had no hereditary rights over the property in representation or substitution of their father as the latter was still alive.

We stress, however, that this adjudication, is only an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.13

Ruling: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The impugned decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 21, 2002, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Churchill v Raffarty 32 Phil 580

Churchill v Raffarty 32 Phil 580

Churchill vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572

December 21, 1915

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Keywords: Police power of the State, Lawful Subject of police power; Billboard removed

Summary:  Plaintiff Churchill and Tait put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province.

British and German Consuls complained that the billboard was rather offensive or a nuisance.

Act No. 2339 allows the Collector of Internal Revenue to collect taxes from such property and to remove it when it is offensive to sight. 

ISSUE: Whether the destruction or removal of any sign, signboard, or billboard which is offensive to the sight was a valid police power?

RULING: There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foregin to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would , without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts. The courts cannot substitute thier own views for what is proper in the premises for those of the Legislature.

Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general

TRENT, J.

Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339. 

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.”

Issue: Whether or not the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government.

Ratio: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.

"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”

"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law.”

"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction.”

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.”

"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well - recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power.

Ruling: For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the merits, with costs. So ordered.

Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659

Ynot v Intermediate Appellate Court 148 SCRA 659

Nature: Review on Certiorari

Keywords: Requirements of due process; Fundamental Powers of the State: POLICE POWER

Summary: RTC - sustained confiscation of the carabaos; and decline to rule on the constitutionality of the EO for lack of authority. IAC - upheld RTC decision. SC - reversed CA decision.

CRUZ, J.

Facts: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos

Issue:

1.     Whether or not the said Executive Order is valid.

Ratio: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Note: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)

Rubi vs. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919)

Nature: APPLICATION OF HABEAS CORPUS
Keywords: NON-CHRISTIAN, NATIVES, DELEGATED IN SPECIFIC AREAS, MADE REFERENCE TO A US CASE THAT INVOLVE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Summary: The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.

Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered  by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.

Issue: Whether due process was followed in the restraint of liberty and imprisonment due to violation of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code.

Held: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns. Action pursuant to Section 2145 does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws and confinement in accordance with the said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Doctrine: AMERICAN DECISIONS MAY IF APPLICABLE, BE CITED IN CASES BROUGHT TO OUR COURTS FOR DECISION

People of the Philippines vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, Aug. 12, 1992

People of the Philippines vs. Damaso, G.R. No. 93516, Aug. 12, 1992

Keywords: invalid search and seizure, NPA, coerced into agreeing to search premises

Summary: Trial Court - finds accused Basilio Damaso alias Bernardo/Bernie Mendoza alias Ka Dado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Presidential Decree Number 1866; SC - REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED

MEDIALDEA, J.:

Facts: On 18 June 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer connected with the 152nd PC Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan, and some companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Gracia Village. They found subversive documents, a radio, a 1 x 7 caliber .45 firearm and other items.

After the raid, the group proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier arrested. They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie Aritumba. She stated that she worked with Bernie Mendoza/Basilio Damaso. She guided the group to the house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza). When they reached the house, the group found that it had already vacated by the occupants. Since Morados was hesitant to give the new address of Damaso (@Mendoza), the group looked for the Barangay Captain of the place and requested him to point out the new house rented by Damaso (@Mendoza).

The group again required Morados to go with them. When they reached the house, the group saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled "Ang Bayan," xerox copiers and a computer machine. They also found persons who were companions of Luz Tanciangco (namely, Teresita Calosa, Ricardo Calosa, Marites Calosa, Eric Tanciangco and Luzviminda Morados).

The group requested the persons in the house to allow them to look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They confiscated the articles and brought them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation. Said persons revealed that Damaso (@Mendoza) was the lessee of the house and owned the items confiscated therefrom. Thus, Basilio Damaso, was originally charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree 1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion, together with Luzviminda Morados y Galang @ Ka Mel, Teresita Calosa y Macabangon @ Ka Tessie, Ricardo Calosa y Perez @ Ka Ric, Marites Calosa y Evangelista @ Ka Tess, Eric Tanciangco y Capira @ Ka Ric and Luz Tanciangco y Pencial @ Ka Luz.

Such information was later amended to exclude all other persons except Damaso from the criminal charge. Upon arraignment, Damaso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution rested its case and offered its exhibits for admission. The defense counsel interposed his objections to the admissibility of the prosecution's evidence on grounds of its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and illegal for lack of a search warrant; and thereafter, manifested that he was not presenting any evidence for the accused. On 17 January 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, finding Damaso guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing the latter to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Damaso appealed.

Issue: Whether there was waiver on the part of Damaso to allow the warrantless search of his house.

Ratio: Damaso was singled out as the sole violator of PD 1866, in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of subversion. There is no substantial and credible evidence to establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and other subversive items were found or the owner of the said items. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Damaso is the lessee of the house, the case against him still will not prosper, the reason being that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid search and seizure proceedings. The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her . The records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. There is no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed Damaso's helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence. The prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco has such an authority. Without this evidence, the authorities' intrusion into Damaso's dwelling cannot be given any color of legality. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. As a consequence, the search conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would have been different if the situation here demanded urgency which could have prompted the authorities to dispense with a search warrant. But the record is silent on this point. The fact that they came to Damaso's house at nighttime, does not grant them the license to go inside his house.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and the appellant is ACQUITTED with costs de oficio.

People of the Philippines vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, Jan. 18, 1991

People of the Philippines vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, Jan. 18, 1991

Nature: Appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Keywords: Found dried marijuana leaves in gift-wrapped packages open by a civillian; valid search

Summary: Special Criminal Court (RTC) - convicted Marti in violation of RA 6425; CA -

BIDIN, J.:

Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.

Ratio: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.