Dennis vs. United States, 341 U.S. 494

Dennis vs. United States, 341 U.S. 494

Nature: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Summary: Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case relating to Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA. The Court ruled that Dennis did not have the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if the exercise involved the creation of a plot to overthrow the government.

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioners, Dennis and others (Petitioners) were convicted for (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. For an impediment on free expression to be permissible, the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability of coming about, must sufficiently outweigh the invasion of free speech necessary to avoid the danger.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE REED, MR. JUSTICE BURTON and MR. JUSTICE MINTON join.

Facts: The Smith Act (the Act) made it a criminal offense for a person to knowingly or willfully advocate the overthrowing of any government in the United States by force or to attempt to commit or conspire to commit the crime the same. The Petitioners were brought up on charges under the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the same. It was clear from the record that the leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a revolution when the opportunity came. The Trial Court found the Petitioners guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted was challenged.

Issue: Whether the gravity of the "evil", discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as necessary to avoid the danger.

Ratio: We adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their significances. More we cannot expect from words.

Likewise, we are in accord with the court below, which affirmed the trial court's finding that the requisite danger existed. The mere fact that, from the period 1945 to 1948, petitioners' activities did not result in an attempt to overthrow the Government by force and violence is, of course, no answer to the fact that there was a group that was ready to make the attempt. The formation by petitioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners, felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflammable nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other countries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned, convince us that their convictions were justified on this score. And this analysis disposes of the contention that a conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from the advocacy itself, cannot be constitutionally restrained, because it comprises only the preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger. If the ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added.

We must apply the “clear and present danger” test. Accordingly, we note that the overthrow of the Government by force is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Obviously, “clear and present danger” does not mean the government may not act until the Putsch has been plotted and on is the verge of being executed.

On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite danger to act existed here: (1) the formation by the Petitioners of a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders (the Petitioners) felt it was time for action; (2) the inflammable nature of world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries; and (4) the touch and go nature of our relations with other countries with whom the Petitioners were ideologically aligned. Thus, the convictions of the Petitioners were justified.

Ruling: The convictions are affirmed.

NOTES: From Encyclopedia Britannica

Dennis v. United States, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on June 4, 1951, upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act (1940), which made it a criminal offense to advocate the violent overthrow of the government or to organize or be a member of any group or society devoted to such advocacy.

The case originated in 1948 when Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the American Communist Party, along with several other high-ranking communists, was arrested and convicted of having violated the Smith Act. The conviction was upheld by lower courts, despite the fact that no evidence existed that Dennis and his colleagues had encouraged any of their followers to commit specific violent acts, and was appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.

Against the backdrop of the case was a growing fear in the United States during the Cold War of a communist takeover of the country. Oral arguments were held on Dec. 1, 1950, and on the following June 4 the Supreme Court issued a 6–2 ruling upholding the convictions, in essence finding that it was constitutional to restrict the guarantee of freedom of speech found in the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment when an individual’s speech was so grave that it represented a vital threat to the security of the country. The court’s plurality opinion was written by Fred M. Vinson, joined by Harold Burton, Sherman Minton, and Stanley Reed, who argued: “Certainly an attempt to overthrow the Government by force, even though doomed from the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.” The ruling further maintained that government need not wait to prohibit speech “until the putsch is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required.” Two other justices, Felix Frankfurter and Robert H. Jackson, voted with the majority but wrote special concurrences that deviated somewhat from the ruling’s overall logic. Frankfurter, in particular, argued that Congress needed to balance free speech protections against the threat of that speech. The court’s opinion ran somewhat contrary to the clear and present danger rule of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in Schenck v. United States in 1919, which required that immediate violence or danger be present for speech to be lawfully limited.

Dissenting from the majority were Hugo L. Black, who had developed a literal interpretation of the Bill of Rights and an absolutist position on First Amendment rights, and William O. Douglas. Black’s eloquent opinion both captured the tenor of the times and was a strong defense of freedom of speech:

So long as this Court exercises the power of judicial review of legislation, I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress’ or our own notions of mere ‘reasonableness.’ Such a doctrine waters down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress. The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those ‘safe’ or orthodox views which rarely need its protection.…Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that, in calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society.

In Yates v. United States (1957), the court later amended its ruling to make parts of the Smith Act unenforceable, and though the law remained on the books, no prosecutions took place under it thereafter.