MERCADO VS CFI 116 SCRA 93

ELIZALDE* VS. CFI 116 SCRA 93 (1982)

* 116 SCRA 93 (1982) is actually called RAFAEL S. MERCADO vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, Branch V, City Fiscal of Quezon City and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO. Elizalde is not a petitioner and the name does not appear anywhere in this case. From this point onwards I will be using the correct petitioner name and case title. TY. (There is an error in Atty. Demigillo's Syllabus) *

Correct case title: MERCADO VS CFI 116 SCRA 93

Nature: Petition for Certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the

Decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

Keywords: freedom of speech, libel arising from communication addressed to a superior about a subordinate; privilege communication

FERNANDO, C.J.

Facts:

a.) On October 14, 1972, petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent, for alleged grave violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules;

b) Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned administrative complaint by petitioner against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the subject libelous telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which was indorsed for investigation to the said Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the said Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation;

c) On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint against the private respondent with the same Board of Transportation docketed therein as Adm. Case No. 72-1, charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy;

d) The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her;

e) On July 17, 1973 petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said Board, in an order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of merit;

f) While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board of Transportation, petitioner, to further harass and malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent, filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the private respondent and her husband Lorenzo M. Mercado accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. The said office, however, after due hearing, issued a resolution on February 9, 1973, recommending that the said case be closed for lack of evidence;

g) Also during the pendency of the administrative complaint filed by petitioner against the private respondent in the Board of Transportation, petitioner filed with the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for corrupt practices against the private respondent; and after due investigation the CIS, in answer to the letter of private respondent's counsel, dated March 24, 1973. requesting information about the result of the said investigation, sent a letter to said counsel, dated March 27, 1973, advising him that the said case is considered closed for insufficiency of evidence.

The comment was considered as answer and the case was set for hearing. Prior to such hearing, there was a motion by petitioner to file memorandum in lieu of oral argument. As the motion was not acted upon before the date set for hearing, the parties appeared. Preliminary questions were asked. They were then required to file simultaneously their memoranda. Instead of just filing a memorandum, petitioner had a motion to admit amended petition enclosing with such motion the amended petition. The memorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof. The amendments, however, did not affect the fundamental question raised as to whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Respondents in due time, after seeking an extension, filed their memorandum. Thereafter, petitioner even submitted a manifestation, in effect reiterating contentions previously made.

Issue: Whether or not the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution, constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed with significance

Held: In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari to annul the order denying the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration does not lie. Neither should respondent court be ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. Q-2936, the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner. Nor should the court be prohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action. This petition lacks merit.

United States v. Bustos, as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is to the credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach.ït¢@lFº The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so.

2. Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." ⁶ His opinion continues: " 'A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.' (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; 3 W.R., 474; 85 E.C.L., 344.)" ⁷He then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary.

The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner.ït¢@lFº The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed