People of the Philippines vs. Vera, 65 Phil.
56
Nature: Original action
instituted in this court for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of
prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may
review the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance, more
particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the
said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining
further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance
with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in said case.
Keywords: Equal Protection
Clause; Act No. 4221 Probation Act,
Summary: Court of
First Instance - rendered judgement of conviction sentencing Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with
reservation of civil action to the offended party; CA - modified the sentence
to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision
correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor,
but affirmed the judgment in all other respects.; SC - denied the petition
subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative motion
for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court
of origin for execution of the judgment.
LAUREL, J.
Facts: Unjieng was convicted
by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated
to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent
of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the
appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to
be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no
power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11
Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial
boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere
in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because
it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if
Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
Issue: WON Act No. 4221
denies the equal protection of the laws.
Held: YES. We are of
the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is unconstitutional and void
because it is also repugnant to equal-protection clause of our Constitution.
Ratio:
The challenged section
of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply
only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only
provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a
system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts
in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their
right to probation.
There is no difference
between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits such
denial. A law may appear to be fair on
its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions.
This basic individual
right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all the tree grand
departments of our government and on the subordinate instrumentalities and
subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police power,
taxation and eminent domain. The equal
protection of laws, sententiously observes the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”
In the case at bar,
however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the
result in every case.
In other words,
statutes may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it
is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may
said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other
provinces, but one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation
officer of a given year — and have probation during that year — and thereafter
decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent
years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which
delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation Act
sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to
prove how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality
clause but "a rope of sand".
The guaranty of the
equality clause does not require territorial uniformity. It should be observed,
however, that this case concerns the right to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases originally granted by General Orders No. 58. No question of
legislative authority was involved and the alleged denial of the equal
protection of the laws was the result of the subsequent enactment of Act No.
612, amending the charter of the City of Manila (Act No. 813) and providing in
section 2 thereof that "in cases
triable only in the court of first instance of the City of Manila, the
defendant . . . shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination
in any case where the prosecuting attorney, after a due investigation of the
facts . . . shall have presented an information against him in proper form . .
. ." Upon the other hand, an analysis of the arguments and the
decision indicates that the investigation by the prosecuting attorney —
although not in the form had in the provinces — was considered a reasonable
substitute for the City of Manila, considering the peculiar conditions of the
city as found and taken into account by the legislature itself.
Ruling: S is hereby declared
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted.
Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
NOTE: In issues involving
the equal protection clause, the test developed by jurisprudence is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class.
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