Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 Case Digest

Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980)

Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen

No. 79-168

Decided January 7, 1980*

444 U.S. 223

Keywords: low housing, NEPA, Manhattan Upper West Side

Parties:

Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. – petitioner

Roland N. Karlen, Alvin C. Hudgins, and the Committee of Neighbors To Insure a Normal Urban Environment (CONTINUE) – respondents

Facts: At the center of this dispute is the site of a proposed low-income housing project to be constructed on Manhattan's Upper West Side. In 1962, the New York City Planning Commission (Commission), acting in conjunction with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), began formulating a plan for the renewal of 20 square blocks known as the "West Side Urban Renewal Area" (WSURA) through a joint effort on the part of private parties and various government agencies.

As originally written, the plan called for a mix of 70% middle-income housing and 30% low-income housing and designated the site at issue here as the location of one of the middle-income projects. In 1969, after substantial progress toward completion of the plan, local agencies in New York determined that the number of low-income units proposed for WSURA would be insufficient to satisfy an increased need for such units. In response to this shortage the Commission amended the plan to designate the site as the future location of a high-rise building containing 160 units of low-income housing. HUD approved this amendment in December 1972.

Meanwhile, in October 1971, the Trinity Episcopal School Corp. (Trinity), which had participated in the plan by building a combination school and middle-income housing development at a nearby location, sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to enjoin the Commission and HUD from constructing low-income housing on the site.

The District Court entered judgment in favor of HUD stating that their decision-making process was adequate. Stryker’s Bay appealed.

The Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case back to HUD and stated that the NEPA required consideration of alternatives to the project.

On remand, the HUD prepared a lengthy report entitled Special Environmental Clearance of 1977 and asserted that they had considered all the relevant factors and still found that project acceptable, the main reason being that relocating the project would result in “unacceptable delay of two years or more”. According to HUD, “measured against the environmental costs associated with the minimum two-year delay, the benefits seem insufficient to justify a mandated substitution of sites.” Stryker’s Bay sued again.

The trial court decided in favor of HUD and found that the HUD had properly and in good faith considered the alternatives and environmental impacts of the project, thereby meeting their requirements under NEPA. Stryker appealed.

The Appelate Court REVERSED the decision of the trial court and stated that “unacceptable delay” was a capricious reason for finding the project acceptable. They instead suggested the HUD to actually consider the environmental factors. HUD appealed.

The US Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Court and found HUD’s assessment to be acceptable.

• The US Supreme Court found that NEPA requires "a fully informed and well-considered decision" but not necessarily "a decision the judges of the Appellate Court would have reached had they been members of the decision-making process."
• Basically, as long as the agency considers the environmental consequences of the project, NEPA is satisfied.  There are no specific rules on how an agency should weigh the factors influencing their decision.

Syllabus

Held: The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that, when the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) considered alternative sites before redesignating a proposed site for middle-income housing as one for low-income housing it should have given determinative weight to environmental factors such as crowding low-income housing into a concentrated area and should not have considered the delay that would occur in developing an alternative site as an overriding factor. Once an agency has made a decision subject to the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken. Here, there is no doubt that HUD considered the environmental consequences of its decision to redesignate the proposed site for low-income housing, and the Act requires no more.

Certiorari granted; 590 F.2d 39, reversed.