PALILEO VS COSIO

PALILEO VS COSIO

G.R. No. L-7667  November 28, 1955

CHERIE PALILEO, plaintiff-appellee, 
BEATRIZ COSIO, defendant-appellant.

Nature:

Keywords: loan transaction equitable mortgage, sale with option to repurchase

Summary:

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.

Facts: Palileo filed a complaint against Cosio in the CFI of Manila raising the ground that, the transaction entered by them be declared as one of loan and that the said transaction be one of equitable mortgage to secure the payment of the loan.

Cosio filed her answer setting up a defense that the transaction between them is one of sale with option to repurchase. However, the period for repurchase had expired which resulted to the ownership of Cosio. The latter set up counterclaims but failed to appear in court in which judgment was granted in favor of the evidence presented by Palileo.

2 Feb 1954, the original counsel of Cosio was substituted and the new counsel immediately moved that the judgment be set aside. The motion has been denied making Cosio to take an appeal.

Coming to the merits of the case, the Court find out that pursuant to the agreement of both, Palileo paid to Cosio an interest on the total loan exceeding the maximum interest authorized by law. To secure the payment, the parties executed a document purporting to convey to Cosio a two-storey building insured the same against fire which is issued in the name of Cosio the insurance policy.

The building was partly destroyed by fire. Cosio on a proper demand, collected indemnity from the insurance company and on the other hand, Palileo demanded from Cosio that she be credited with the necessary amount to pay her obligation out of the insurance proceeds. Cosio refused to pay.

Issue: WON a mortgagor is entitled to the insurance proceeds of the mortgaged property independently insured by the mortgagee? What is the effect of the insurance?

Held: NO. The rule is that “where a mortgagee, independently of the mortgagor, insures the mortgaged property in his own name and for his own interest, he is entitled to the insurance proceeds in case of loss, but in such case, he is not allowed to retain his claim against the mortgagor, but is passed by subrogation to the insurer to the extent of the money paid.” (Vance on Insurance, 2d ed., p. 654) Or, stated in another way, “the mortgagee may insure his interest in the property independently of the mortgagor. In that event, upon the destruction of the property the insurance money paid to the mortgagee will not inure to the benefit of the mortgagor, and the amount due under the mortgage debt remains unchanged. The mortgagee, however, is not allowed to retain his claim against the mortgagor, but it passes by subrogation to the insurer, to the extent of the insurance money paid.”

Ruling: Consistent with the foregoing pronouncement, we therefore modify the judgment of the lower court as follows:(1) the transaction had between the plaintiff and defendant as shown in Exhibit A is merely an equitable mortgage intended to secure the payment of the loan of P12,000;(2) that the proceeds of the insurance amounting to P13,107.00 was properly collected by defendant who is not required to account for it to the plaintiff; (3) that the collection of said insurance proceeds shall not be deemed to have compensated the obligation of the plaintiff to the defendant, but bars the latter from claiming its payment from the former; and (4) defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of P810.00 representing the overpayment made by plaintiff by way of interest on the loan. No pronouncement as to costs.

SIGA-AN VS VILLANUEVA

SIGA-AN VS VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 173227  January 20, 2009

SEBASTIAN SIGA-AN, Petitioner, 
ALICIA VILLANUEVA, Respondent.

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Keywords: Loan, not in writing, no stipulation of interest

Summary: Respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner. Respondent claimed that petitioner approached her inside the PNO and offered to loan her the amount of P540,000.00 of which the loan agreement was not reduced in writing and there was no stipulation as to the payment of interest for the loan. Respondent issued a check worth P500,000.00 to petitioner as partial payment of the loan.  She then issued another check in the amount of P200,000.00 to petitioner as payment of the remaining balance of the loan of which the excess amount of P160,000.00 would be applied as interest for the loan.  Not satisfied with the amount applied as interest, petitioner pestered her to pay additional interest and threatened to block or disapprove her transactions with the PNO if she would not comply with his demand. Thus, she paid additional amounts in cash and checks as interests for the loan.  She asked petitioner for receipt for the payments but was told that it was not necessary as there was mutual trust and confidence between them. According to her computation, the total amount she paid to petitioner for the loan and interest accumulated to P1,200,000.00.

The RTC rendered a Decision holding that respondent made an overpayment of her loan obligation to petitioner and that the latter should refund the excess amount to the former.  It ratiocinated that respondent’s obligation was only to pay the loaned amount of P540,000.00, and that the alleged interests due should not be included in the computation of respondent’s total monetary debt because there was no agreement between them regarding payment of interest.  It concluded that since respondent made an excess payment to petitioner in the amount of P660,000.00 through mistake, petitioner should return the said amount to respondent pursuant to the principle of solutio indebiti. Also, petitioner should pay moral damages for the sleepless nights and wounded feelings experienced by respondent.  Further, petitioner should pay exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good, plus attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Facts:

On 30 March 1998, respondent Alicia Villanueva filed a complaint⁵ for sum of money against petitioner Sebastian Siga-an before the Las Pinas City Regional Trial Court. Respondent alleged that she was a businesswoman engaged in supplying office materials and equipments to the Philippine Navy Office (PNO), while petitioner was a military officer and comptroller of the PNO from 1991 to 1996.

Villanueva claimed that sometime in 1992, petitioner Siga-an approached her inside the PNO and offered to loan her the amount of ₱540,000.00. Since she needed capital for her business transactions with the PNO, she accepted petitioner’s proposal. The loan agreement was not reduced in writing. Also, there was no stipulation as to the payment of interest for the loan.

On 31 August 1993, respondent issued a check worth ₱500,000.00 to petitioner as partial payment of the loan. On 31 October 1993, she issued another check in the amount of ₱200,000.00 to petitioner as payment of the remaining balance of the loan. Petitioner told her that since she paid a total amount of ₱700,000.00 for the ₱540,000.00 worth of loan, the excess amount of ₱160,000.00 would be applied as interest for the loan.

Not satisfied with the amount applied as interest, petitioner pestered her to pay additional interest. Petitioner threatened to block or disapprove her transactions with the PNO if she would not comply with his demand. As all her transactions with the PNO were subject to the approval of petitioner as comptroller of the PNO, and fearing that petitioner might block or unduly influence the payment of her vouchers in the PNO, she conceded. Thus, she paid additional amounts in cash and checks as interests for the loan. She asked petitioner for receipt for the payments but petitioner told her that it was not necessary as there was mutual trust and confidence between them. According to her computation, the total amount she paid to petitioner for the loan and interest accumulated to ₱1,200,000.00.⁷

Thereafter, respondent consulted a lawyer regarding the propriety of paying interest on the loan despite absence of agreement to that effect. Her lawyer told her that petitioner could not validly collect interest on the loan because there was no agreement between her and petitioner regarding payment of interest. Since she paid petitioner a total amount of ₱1,200,000.00 for the ₱540,000.00 worth of loan, and upon being advised by her lawyer that she made overpayment to petitioner, she sent a demand letter to petitioner asking for the return of the excess amount of ₱660,000.00. Petitioner, despite receipt of the demand letter, ignored her claim for reimbursement.

Respondent prayed that the RTC render judgment ordering petitioner to pay respondent (1) ₱660,000.00 plus legal interest from the time of demand; (2) ₱300,000.00 as moral damages; (3) ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) an amount equivalent to 25% of ₱660,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Petitioner insisted that there was no overpayment because respondent admitted in the latter’s promissory note that her monetary obligation as of 12 September 1994 amounted to ₱1,240,000.00 inclusive of interests. He argued that respondent was already estopped from complaining that she should not have paid any interest, because she was given several times to settle her obligation but failed to do so. He maintained that to rule in favor of respondent is tantamount to concluding that the loan was given interest-free. Based on the foregoing averments, he asked the RTC to dismiss respondent’s complaint.

Issue:

1. Whether or not interest was due to petitioner;  (

2. Whether the principle of solutio indebiti applies to the case at bar.

Held: (1) No. Compensatory interest is not chargeable in the instant case because it was not duly proven that respondent defaulted in paying the loan and no interest was due on the loan because there was no written agreement as regards payment of interest. Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically mandates that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.  As can be gleaned from the foregoing provision, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if: (1) there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (2) the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing.  The concurrence of the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest.  Thus, we have held that collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.  

(2) Petitioner cannot be compelled to return the alleged excess amount paid by respondent as interest. Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerning solutio indebiti shall be applied.  Article 2154 of the Civil Code explains the principle of solutio indebiti.  Said provision provides that if something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.  In such a case, a creditor-debtor relationship is created under a quasi-contract whereby the payor becomes the creditor who then has the right to demand the return of payment made by mistake, and the person who has no right to receive such payment becomes obligated to return the same.  The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti harks back to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another.  The principle of solutio indebiti applies where (1) a payment is made when there exists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the payment; and (2) the payment is made through mistake, and not through liberality or some other cause.  We have held that the principle of solutio indebiti applies in case of erroneous payment of undue interest. 

Article 2232 of the Civil Code states that in a quasi-contract, such as solutio indebiti, exemplary damages may be imposed if the defendant acted in an oppressive manner.  Petitioner acted oppressively when he pestered respondent to pay interest and threatened to block her transactions with the PNO if she would not pay interest.  This forced respondent to pay interest despite lack of agreement thereto.  Thus, the award of exemplary damages is appropriate so as to deter petitioner and other lenders from committing similar and other serious wrongdoings.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71814, dated 16 December 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the amount of ₱660,000.00 as refundable amount of interest is reduced to THREE HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (₱335,000.00); (2) the amount of ₱300,000.00 imposed as moral damages is reduced to ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱150,000.00); (3) an interest of 6% per annum is imposed on the ₱335,000.00, on the damages awarded and on the attorney’s fees to be computed from the time of the extra-judicial demand on 3 March 1998 up to the finality of this Decision; and (4) an interest of 12% per annum is also imposed from the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction. Costs against petitioner.

REPUBLIC VS BAGTAS

REPUBLIC VS BAGTAS

G.R. No. L-17474  October 25, 1962

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
JOSE V. BAGTAS, defendant, 
FELICIDAD M. BAGTAS, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate left by the late Jose V. Bagtas, petitioner-appellant.

Nature: The Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court because only questions of law are raised.

Keywords: liability in cases of force majeure, borrowing of 3 bulls and failure to return or purchase, Bureau of Animal Industry, Bagtas, Cagayan

Summary: Bagtas borrowed three bulls from the Bureau of Animal Industry for one year for breeding purposes subject to payment of breeding fee of 10% of book value of the bull. Upon expiration, Bagtas asked for renewal. The renewal was granted only to one bull. Bagtas offered to buy the bulls at its book value less depreciation but the Bureau refused. The Bureau said that Bagtas should either return or buy it at book value. Bagtas proved that he already returned two of the bulls, and the other bull died during a Huk raid, hence, obligation already extinguished. He claims that the contract is a commodatum hence, loss through fortuitous event should be borne by the owner.

PADILLA, J.

Facts: Jose Bagtas borrowed from the Bureau of Animal Industry three bulls for a period of one year for breeding purposes subject to a government charge of breeding fee of 10% of the book value of the books. Upon the expiration of the contract, Bagtas asked for a renewal for another one year, however, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approved only the renewal for one bull and other two bulls be returned. Bagtas then wrote a letter to the Director of Animal Industry that he would pay the value of the three bulls with a deduction of yearly depreciation. The Director advised him that the value cannot be depreciated and asked Bagtas to either return the bulls or pay their book value. Bagtas neither paid nor returned the bulls. The Republic then commenced an action against Bagtas ordering him to return the bulls or pay their book value. 

LC: *Trial court: After hearing, the trial Court ruled in favor of the Republic, as such, the Republic moved ex parte for a writ of execution which the court granted. 

INTERVENING FACT: Felicidad Bagtas, the surviving spouse and administrator of Bagtas' estate, returned the two bulls and filed a motion to quash the writ of execution since one bull cannot be returned for it was killed by gunshot during a Huk raid. The Court denied her motion hence, this appeal certified by the Court of Appeals because only questions of law are raised.

Issue:

1.     WON the contract was commodatum

2.     WON Bagtas should be held liable for its loss due to force majeure.

Held:

1.     NO, the contract is not commodatum.

2.     YES, he is liable for the loss.

Ratio: A contract of commodatum is essentially gratuitous. Supreme Court held that Bagtas was liable for the loss of the bull even though it was caused by a fortuitous event. If the contract was one of lease, then the 10% breeding charge is compensation (rent) for the use of the bull and Bagtas, as lessee, is subject to the responsibilities of a possessor. He is also in bad faith because he continued to possess the bull even though the term of the contract has already expired. 

If the contract was one of commodatum, he is still liable because: (1) he kept the bull longer than the period stipulated; and (2) the thing loaned has been delivered with appraisal of its value (10%). No stipulation that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability. 

The original period of the loan was from 8 May 1948 to 7 May 1949. The loan of one bull was renewed for another period of one year to end on 8 May 1950. But the appellant kept and used the bull until November 1953 when during a Huk raid, it was killed by stray bullets. Furthermore, when lent and delivered to the deceased husband of the appellant the bulls had each an appraised book value, to with: the Sindhi, at P1,176.46, the Bhagnari at P1,320.56 and the Sahiniwal at P744.46. It was not stipulated that in case of loss of the bull due to fortuitous event the late husband of the appellant would be exempt from liability.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the writ of execution appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

GUINGONA VS CITY FISCAL

GUINGONA VS CITY FISCAL

G.R. No. L-60033 April 4, 1984

TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., ANTONIO I. MARTIN, and TERESITA SANTOS, petitioners, 
THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, HON. JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, ASST. CITY FISCAL FELIZARDO N. LOTA and CLEMENT DAVID, respondents.

Nature: Petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for the immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking  to prohibit the public respondent which is the City Fiscal of Manila  from proceeding with the preliminary investigation, in which they were charged by private respondent Clement David

Keywords: Bank deposits are loans, mutuum, estafa, criminal charge, civil case, thrift bank, NSLA

Summary: From March 1979 to March 1981, Clement David made several investments with the National Savings and Loan Association (NSLA). On March 21, 1981, the Bangko Sentral placed the bank under receivership. Upon David’s request, petitioners Guingona and Martin issued a joint promissory note, absorbing the obligations of the bank. On July 17, 1981, they divided the indebtedness. David filed a complaint for estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations regarding foreign exchange transactions before the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. Petitioners filed the herein petition for prohibition and injunction with a prayer for immediate issuance of restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the public respondents to proceed with the preliminary investigation on the ground that the petitioners’ obligation is civil in nature.

MAKASIAR, Actg. C.J.

Facts: David invested several deposits with the Nation Savings and Loan Association [NSLA]. He said that he was induced into making said investments by an Australian national who was a close associate of the petitioners [NSLA officials]. On March 1981, NSLA was placed under receivership by the Central Bank, so David filed claims for his and his sister’s investments.

On June 1981, Guingona and Martin, upon David’s request, assumed the bank’s obligation to David by executing a joint promissory note. On July 1981, David received a report that only a portion of his investments was entered in the NSLA records.

On December 1981, David filed I.S. No. 81-31938 in the Office of the City Fiscal, which case was assigned to Asst. City Fiscal Lota for preliminary investigation. David charged petitioners with estafa and violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364 and related regulations on foreign exchange transactions.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction because David's claims allegedly comprised a purely civil obligation, but the motion was denied. After the presentation of David's principal witness, petitioners filed this petition for prohibition and injunction because:

a. The production of various documents showed that the transactions between David and NSLA were simple loans (civil obligations which were novated when Guingona and Martin assumed them)

b. David's principal witness testified that the duplicate originals of the instruments of indebtedness were all on file with NSLA.

A TRO was issued ordering the respondents to refrain from proceeding with the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 81-31938.

Petitioners’ liability is civil in nature, so respondents have no jurisdiction over the estafa charge. TRO CORRECTLY ISSUED.

Issue:

1. Whether the contract between NSLA and David is a contract of depositor or a contract of loan, which answer determines whether the City Fiscal has the jurisdiction to file a case for estafa

2. Whether there was a violation of Central Bank Circular No. 364

Held:

1.  When David invested his money on time and savings deposits with NSLA, the contract that was perfected was a contract of simple loan or mutuum and not a contract of deposit. Hence, the relationship between David and NSLA is that of creditor and debtor, consequently, the ownership of the amount deposited was transmitted to the Bank upon the perfection of the contract and it can make use of the amount deposited for its banking operations, such as to pay interests on deposits and to pay withdrawals..

While the Bank has the obligation to return the amount deposited, it has no obligation to return or deliver the same money that was deposited. NSLA’s failure to return the amount deposited will not constitute estafa through misappropriation punishable under Article 315, par. L (b) of the Revised Penal Code, but it will only give rise to civil liability over which the public respondents have no jurisdiction.

Considering that petitioners’ liability is purely civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Public respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice.

Even granting that NSLA’s failure to pay the time and savings deposits would constitute a violation of RPC 315, paragraph 1(b), any incipient criminal liability was deemed avoided. When NSLA was placed under receivership, Guingona and Martin assumed the obligation to David, thereby resulting in the novation of the original contractual obligation. The original trust relation between NSLA and David was converted into an ordinary debtor-creditor relation between the petitioners and David. While it is true that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court.

2. Petitioner Guingona merely accommodated the request of the Nation Savings and loan Association in order to clear the bank draft through his dollar account because the bank did not have a dollar account. Immediately after the bank draft was cleared, petitioner Guingona authorized Nation Savings and Loan Association to withdraw the same in order to be utilized by the bank for its operations. It is safe to assume that the U.S. dollars were converted first into Philippine pesos before they were accepted and deposited in Nation Savings and Loan Association, because the bank is presumed to have followed the ordinary course of the business which is to accept deposits in Philippine currency only, and that the transaction was regular and fair, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

In conclusion, considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, We hold that the public respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue, even if the petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice, would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless the proper administration of justice

Ruling: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED; THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PREVIOUSLY ISSUED IS MADE PERMANENT.

Note:

GENERAL RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be blocked by court prohibition or injunction.

EXCEPTIONS

1. For the orderly administration of justice

2. To prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner

3. To avoid multiplicity of actions

4. To afford adequate protection to constitutional rights

5. In proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid

CATHOLIC VICAR VS. CA

CATHOLIC VICAR VS. CA

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, petitioner, 
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN VALDEZ, respondents

G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988

Nature: Review on certiorari

Keywords: Recovery of possession, commodatum, adverse possession

Summary: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (VICAR for brevity) filed an application for registration of title over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4, said Lots being the sites of the Catholic Church building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, school dormitories, social hall, stonewalls, etc. The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed their Answer/Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and 3, respectively, asserting ownership and title thereto since their predecessors’ house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed.. After trial on the merits, the land registration court promulgated its Decision confirming the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Heirs of Juan Valdez appealed the decision of the land registration court to the then Court of Appeals, The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. Thereupon, the VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.

GANCAYCO, J.

Facts:

-  1962: Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province (Vicar), petitioner, filed with the court an application for the registration of title over lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 situated in Poblacion Central, Benguet, said lots being used as sites of the Catholic Church, building, convents, high school building, school gymnasium, dormitories, social hall and stonewalls.

- 1963: Heirs of Juan Valdez and Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano claimed that they have ownership over lots 1, 2 and 3. (2 separate civil cases)

- 1965: The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of Vicar to lots 1 , 2, 3 and 4. Upon appeal by the private respondents (heirs), the decision of the lower court was reversed. Title for lots 2 and 3 were cancelled.

- VICAR filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his  application for registration of Lots 2 and 3.

- During trial, the Heirs of Octaviano presented one (1) witness, who testified on the alleged ownership of the land in question (Lot 3) by their predecessor-in-interest, Egmidio Octaviano; his written demand to Vicar for the return of the land to them; and the reasonable rentals for the use of the land at P10,000 per month. On the other hand, Vicar presented the Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet, Atty. Sison, who testified that the land in question is not covered by any title in the name of Egmidio Octaviano or any of the heirs. Vicar dispensed with the testimony of Mons. Brasseur when the heirs admitted that the witness if called to the witness stand, would testify that Vicar has been in possession of Lot 3, for 75 years continuously and peacefully and has constructed permanent structures thereon.

Issue:

1. WON Vicar had been in possession of lots 2 and 3 merely as bailee borrower in commodatum, a gratuitous loan for use.

2. Whether or not the failure to return the subject matter of commodatum constitutes an adverse possession on the part of the owner

Held:

1. YES. Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee.

2. No. The bailees’ failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.

Petitioner repudiated the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.

Ratio: The Court of Appeals found that petitioner Vicar did not meet the requirement of 30 years possession for acquisitive prescription over Lots 2 and 3. Neither did it satisfy the requirement of 10 years possession for ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title. The appellate court did not believe the findings of the trial court that Lot 2 was acquired from Juan Valdez by purchase and Lot 3 was acquired also by purchase from Egmidio Octaviano by petitioner Vicar because there was absolutely no documentary evidence to support the same and the alleged purchases were never mentioned in the application for registration.

Ruling: WHEREFORE AND BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit, the Decision dated Aug. 31, 1987 in CA-G.R. Nos. 05148 and 05149, by respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner