Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 632, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995

Nature: Petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein.

Keywords: Probable Cause; Issuing of Warrants; Due Process; Vizconde Rape Case

PUNO, J.

Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.

Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.

Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape and homicide

2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them

3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation

4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.

Held:

1. NO.

2. NO.

3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.

4. NO.

Ratio:

1.    The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ." An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. he terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street. It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.

2.     The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.

3. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:

Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995.

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against them.

Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:

            Sec. 4.            Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the             Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause             except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of             manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had             already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal             shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.

            An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold             the filing of the information in court.

            Sec. 2.            When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from                         receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only             by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days fromvs receipt of the resolution and                         shall continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the             movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)

4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal basis).

With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth.

With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.

Ruling: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

Notes:

Sec. 3.            Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4.            Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Sec. 5.            Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

NOTES 2 COMPENDUM:

Facts: Petitioners were charged with rape with homicide. The corresponding warrants were issued for their arrest a few hours later. Petitioners argued that the warrants were invalid because the judges who missed them did not conduct a preliminary examination first,

Held: The Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants. Judges are not required to conduct a searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest. Judges merely determine personally the probability of guilt of the accused. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.