ABDULA VS GUIANI CASE DIGEST

ABDULA VS GUIANI CASE DIGEST

MAYOR BAI UNGGIE D. ABDULA and ODIN ABDULA, petitioners, vs. HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, respondent.

[G.R. No. 118821. February 18, 2000]

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the warrant of arrest issued by herein respondent Japal guiani, then presiding judge of Branch 14 of RTC of Cotabato City, was filed before the Supreme Court. Murder complaint was filed but was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor on the ground that there was no prima facie case for murder, for  a number of accused (6). However, he recommended the filing of an information for murder against one of the respondents (accused) only before the sala of the respondent judge Guiani. Guiani returned the case to the provincial prosecutor for further investigation since there was no necessary resolution required under the Rules of Court to show how the investigating prosecutor arrived at such a conclusion (charging only one of the 8 respondent-accused). Upon the return of the records of the case, it was assigned for reinvestigation to another prosecutor who then recommended the filing of charges against 5 accused, 2 of whom are herein petitioners.

On January 2, 1995, information was filed against petitioner-spouses and 3 others. The following day, January 3, respondent Judge issued a warrant for the arrest of petitioners. On January 4, petitioners filed an urgent Ex-Parte motion for the setting aside the warrant of arrest. On January 11, a petition for review was filed with the DOJ. Despite said filing, respondent judge did not act upon petitioner’s pending Motion to Set Aside the Warrant of Arrest. Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying the warrant of Arrest be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Issue:

WON the Warrant of Arrest should be set aside and declared void ab initio.

Held:

The Court reiterated the provisions of Section 2, Art. III, 1987 Constititution: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Court held that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine probable
cause "personally," a requirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions. The Court said that the emphasis demonstrates the intent of the framers to place a greater degree ofresponsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions. Accordingly, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Court furthered, following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: 

(1)                    personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or

(2)                    if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

In Ho vs. People, it enumerated the existing jurisprudence on the matter as follows:

Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge.

Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence or nonexistence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. The responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or non-existence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land.

Lastly, the Court said that it is not required that complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.