Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)

Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)

Manosca Vs Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)

Facts:

Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4  of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:

According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . .

ISSUES: Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court

Ruling:

Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.⁹ It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty.  The only direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."  This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.

The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:

Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or "public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.

The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs

Province of Camarines Sur Vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)

Province of Camarines Sur Vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)

Nature: appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR.

Facts:

December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.

Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.

San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the province to take possession of the properties.

San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition, Asked by the CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval of the president for the province to expropriate properties. However, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing purpose).

CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation of the property until th province has acquired the approval of DAR.

Ruling:

The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 198, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.

Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

Sumulong  vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

Sumulong vs. Guerrero

Facts:

On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty-five (25) hectares in Antipolo, Rizal including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."

On January 17, 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued a writ of possession when the NHA deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P158, 980.00. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law, which was however denied. Hence, the resort to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1224 is violative of the due process clause since “socialized housing'' for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is not really for a public purpose.

Ruling:

No. PD 1224 is not violative of the due process clause since “socialized housing'' for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is really for a public purpose.

The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

Napocor v. San Pedro, G.R. 170945, September 26, 2006

Facts Of the Case:

For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386.

The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed.7 However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board Resolution No. 97-2468 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion, on the following premises:

·       The proposed land valuations were evaluated and analyzed using the joint appraisal report on fair market value of lands by Cuervo Appraisal, Inc., Development Bank of the Philippines, and the Land Bank of the Philippines and the fair market values established by the respective Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Zambales, Pangasinan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Bulacan as well as the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) of San Carlos and Cabanatuan.

·       For lot acquisition, adopt PAC or CUERVO Appraisal, whichever is lower; if there is a problem of acceptance, refer same to the Board;

·       For easement over agricultural lands, adopt median or average if there are several amounts involved; and

·       Always oppose any proposals for conversion of agricultural lands.

On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan against Maria and other landowners.

Maria San Pedro filed her Answer on February 2, 1998, alleging that there had already been an agreement as to the just compensation for her property. She prayed, among others, that she should be paid the consideration stated in the Right of Way Grant, P600.00 per sq m for the residential portion of the land as agreed upon by her and NPC, and to base the values from Resolution No. 97-00512 of the Provincial Appraisal Committee.

During the pre-trial on January 25, 1999, the parties agreed that the only issue for resolution was the just compensation for the property. The court appointed a committee of commissioners to ascertain and recommend to the trial court the just compensation for the properties.

On June 6, 2001, the trial court issued an Order granting the motion of the heirs and denied that of NPC. The RTC declared that the just compensation for the residential portion of the property should be the same as that of the spouses Lagula's property, which was P499.00 per sq m. On the claim of NPC in its motion for reconsideration that it should be made to pay only an easement fee, the trial court ruled that Lot No. 2076 should be treated the same way as NPC treated the properties of the spouses Lagula. It was pointed out that in the compromise agreements executed by plaintiff and spouses Lagula, plaintiff paid P499.00 per sq m on the basis of a straight sale of their agricultural land, and not merely an easement fee for a right of way thereon.

NPC appealed to the CA asserting that the lower court erred in its decision and prayed for modification.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner paid just compensation?

RULING:

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.39 To determine the just compensation to be paid to the landowner, the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion.40

In the July 12, 1999 Majority Report, the commissioners found that the property was located in a highly-developed area and was accessible through an all-weather road. The fact that the property had potential for full development as shown by the existence of building projects in the vicinity, and the long-term effect of the expropriation on the lives, comfort and financial condition of petitioners was likewise considered. The report also took into account the ocular inspection conducted by the commissioners on May 11, 1999. The tax declaration of the subject property,41 the NPC sketch plan,42 the location plan,43 the zoning certificates,44 the zonal valuation of the BIR,45 and the opinion values46 were also considered.

As had been amply explained by this Court in Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay:

Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.

In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

Napocor vs. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Plaintiff National Power Corporation (NPC), a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is vested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendant spouses Gutierrez. Chiefly, the only controversy existing between the party’s litigants is the reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or compensation fee of the expropriated properties. It is the contention of petitioner that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land of P 10 pesos per square meter traversed by its transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easement (for the passage of transmission lines) transmits no rights, except that of the easement. Full ownership is retained by the private respondents and they are not totally deprived of the use of the land. They can continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those that would result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits that if full market value is required, then full transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent otherwise, they are to pay only P1 per square meter as identified by the corporation commissioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.

RULING:

While it is true that plaintiff is (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property.

The nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation.

Republic vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil.443 (1958)

Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)

Nature:   Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

Keywords:   Power of Eminent Domain, ordinance which prohibits the construction of building that blocks the view of the town plaza

Summary:  

Court of First Instance - convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to obstruction of the town plaza view;

CA - forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.”;

SC - ruled that Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

REYES, J. B. L., J.

Facts:  Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camarines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.

Issue:   Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional

Held:   NO. Petition Granted.

The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

x x x           x x x           x x x

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

Ruling: We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Note: JUST COMPENSATION: The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution proscribes the taking of private property by the government for public use without just compensation. No precise formula exists by which the elements of just compensation can be calculated. Ordinarily, the amount should be based upon the loss to the owner, as opposed to the gain by the taker. The owner should be fairly and fully indemnified for the damage that he or she has sustained. The owner has a right to recover the monetary equivalent of the property taken and is entitled to be put in as good a financial position as he or she would have been in if the property had not been taken. Generally, the measure of damages for property condemned through eminent domain is its fair market value, since the sentimental value to the owner is not an element for consideration. Market value, however, is not an absolute method of valuation but rather a practical standard to aid the courts in their determination of just compensation based upon constitutional requirements.

When just compensation is assessed, all elements that can appropriately enter into the question of value are regarded. For example, the original cost of the property taken, added to the cost of reproduction or replacement, minus depreciation, can be considered when the market value of property is determined.

City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

City Govt. of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 (1983)

Summary: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.

Gutierrez Jr., J.

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof" provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorises the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.

Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974), G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974

Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974)

Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.

Keywords: expropriation proceedings; taking of property; lessor/lessee

Facts:

After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the government argued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The owner maintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee because the essential elements of the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property as lesse.

Ratio: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.

Ruling:

The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period, (3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contract of lease.

In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national Security. 7

Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." 8

Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in support of the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned the Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior to August 10, 1959. 9

In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of lease,

Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. 13

Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.

First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.

Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud — the question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice — of such intention on the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484).

Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.

Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property was used by the air force of the AFP.

Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

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No. L-20620

August 15, 1974

Facts:

Philippine Government filed an eminent domain case against the estate of Castellvi for a 760,000 sqm. Parcel of land in Pampanga. Government alleged that the valuation should not be more than 2000 pesos per sqm or a total of 259000 peso and prayed that the provisional value should be set at that price. Castellvi contended that it is actually worth 15 pesos per sqm or a total of 11,400,000.00. The alleged taking started when the Government through the Philippine Air Force has been occupying the lot under lease since 1947 but on 1956 Castellvi refused to renew lease contract and opted to have the lot subdivided and sold to the public. Government opposed since they introduced improvements to the lot worth 500,000 pesos.

The Government alleged that the “taking” should be counted from 1947 by virtue of the lease agreement. Castellvi insists that it should start from the time the lease contract had expired on 1956. They filed the case on June 1959.

Issue:

Is the Government’s position correct?

Held:

No. Castellvi is Correct.

Ratio:

First, the expropriator must enter the property, which is admitted in this case.

Second, the entrance must be more than a momentary period. In this case, the lease contract was renewable annually. The entry on 1947 under lease was temporary and considered transitory. Even if AFP constructed improvements, it does not alter the fact that the entry was not permanent, in that it was meant to last only for a year. Lease contract contained express provision that Government would return lot at the end of the agreement. Express contract provision prevails over “intent” to take.

Third, the public use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. In this case, the entry of the AFP into the property did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner during the lease period.

Neither is the Government’s contention that the fact that the lease provision was year to year it had the permanent right to occupy.

The determination of just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint under Sec. 4, Rule 67. Government was placed in possession over the property only on August 1959. The value should be based on June 1959, the date the case was filed.

On the issue of the value of the land, Government insists that the land is still agricultural land, hence should be valued at around 20 centavos per sqm. However, the land has not been used for agriculture since the occupation by the AFP. It was even declared under its Tax declaration to be a residential lot of which they have been paying taxes. The court valued the lot at 5 pesos per sqm instead of the 10 pesos per sqm as declared by the Commissioners. SC decided this was the fair price.

On the issue of interest, 6% interest is imposed beginning August 10, 1959 or the time the lot’s possession was given to the Government. 

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000

Barangay San Roque v.  Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896 June 20, 2000

Summary: Barangay San Roque of Talisay, Cebu filed a complaint to expropriate the property of Pator with MTC. The MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that “The principal cause of action is the exercise of the power of eminent domain. The fact that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.” This was then filed to RTC but was dismissed, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. The property value was less than 20k and should be filed with MTC.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that an action for eminent domain is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC and not with MTC.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.  It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land involved that its assessed value is only P1,740.00. Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTCs. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved is located.

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of the MTC?

RULING:

The Court ruled that the action for eminent domain is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.  In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money but it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take private property for public use. The subject of an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.  The value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it.  However, this is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.  The amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano, the Court held that "condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," the forerunners of the RTCs. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation."  The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.

Also, the Court is not persuaded by respondents’ argument that the present action involves the title to or possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or possession of a parcel of land.  Their reliance is misplaced.  Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real and personal actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions, not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.