Republic vs. Fajardo, 104 Phil.443 (1958)

Republic vs. Fajardo , 104 Phil.443 (1958)

Nature:   Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

Keywords:   Power of Eminent Domain, ordinance which prohibits the construction of building that blocks the view of the town plaza

Summary:  

Court of First Instance - convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to obstruction of the town plaza view;

CA - forwarded the case to the SC because “the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.”;

SC - ruled that Ordinance No. 7 went beyond the authority that the municipality could enact and is therefore null and void. Fajardo et al., acquitted.

REYES, J. B. L., J.

Facts:  Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camarines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the grant of permission to the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s constitutionality.

Issue:   Whether or not the ordinance is constitutional

Held:   NO. Petition Granted.

The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

x x x           x x x           x x x

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)

Ruling: We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Note: JUST COMPENSATION: The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution proscribes the taking of private property by the government for public use without just compensation. No precise formula exists by which the elements of just compensation can be calculated. Ordinarily, the amount should be based upon the loss to the owner, as opposed to the gain by the taker. The owner should be fairly and fully indemnified for the damage that he or she has sustained. The owner has a right to recover the monetary equivalent of the property taken and is entitled to be put in as good a financial position as he or she would have been in if the property had not been taken. Generally, the measure of damages for property condemned through eminent domain is its fair market value, since the sentimental value to the owner is not an element for consideration. Market value, however, is not an absolute method of valuation but rather a practical standard to aid the courts in their determination of just compensation based upon constitutional requirements.

When just compensation is assessed, all elements that can appropriately enter into the question of value are regarded. For example, the original cost of the property taken, added to the cost of reproduction or replacement, minus depreciation, can be considered when the market value of property is determined.